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Abstract
We evaluate a simple allocation mechanism of students to majors at college entry that was
commonly used in universities in Brazil in the 1990s and 2000s. Students rst chose a single
major and then took exams that select them in or out of the chosen major. The literature
analyzing student placement, points out that this decentralized mechanism is not stable and
is not strategy-proof. This means that some pairs of major & students can be made better o¤
and that students tend to disguise their preferences using such a mechanism. We build up a
model of performance and school choices in which expectations are carefully specied and we
estimate it using cross-section data reporting choices between two medical schools and grade
performances at the entry exams. Given those estimates, we evaluate changes in selection
and studentsexpected utilities when other mechanisms are implemented. Results highlight
the importance of strategic motives and redistributive e¤ects of changes of the allocation
mechanisms.
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1 Introduction1
Matching students with university majors in Brazil is a very competitive process and in particular
in public federal universities which are mostly the best institutions. More than two millions of
students competed to access one of the 331,105 seats in 2006. In some majors, medicine or law for
instance, the ratio of applications to available seats can be as high as 20 or more (INEP, 2008).
Fierce competition is by no means the exclusivity of Brazilian universities. What made Brazil
specic in the years 2000s was the formality of the selection process at the level of each university.
In contrast to countries such as the United States where the predominant selection system uses
multiple criteria (for instance, Arcidiacono, 2005), selection using only objective performance
under the form of grades at exams is pervasive in Brazil. More than 88% of available seats are
allocated through a vestibular as is called the sequence of exams taken by applicants to university
degrees (INEP, 2008). Moreover, in contrast to countries such as Turkey (Balinski and Sonmez,
1999), the organization of selection was decentralized at the level of universities until 2010.
In this paper, we use comprehensive data on the choices of majors by students and the grades
that they obtain at the vestibular of the Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC thereafter) in
Northeast Brazil in 2004 and we concentrate on the specics of this case. The main characteristics
of this vestibular is that it is further decentralized at the level of each major. Students choose a
single undergraduate major before the exams and compete only against those students who made
the same choice. Another interesting characteristic is that the exam consists in two stages. The
rst stage is common to all majors and consists of many multiple-choice tests evaluating knowledge
in a denite subject, e.g. mathematics, Portuguese etc.. The second stage exams are specic to
each major and have a more traditional short-answer or essay format.
The issue at hand is to match students with colleges which are in our case, the schools o¤ering
undergraduate majors at the university (medicine, engineering and so on). Matching students to
1This is a much revised version of a previous paper entitled "College Choice and Entry Exams" by two of
the coauthors that has been circulated since 2009. Useful discussions with Yinghua He, Jean-Marc Robin and
comments by participants at conferences in Brown, Bristol, Atlanta, Northwestern, Shanghai and Rio de Janeiro
and seminars at Oxford, CREST, CEMMAP, Cambridge, Amsterdam and Barcelona are gratefully acknowledged.
This research has received nancial support from CNPq (Project 21207) and the European Research Council under
the European Communitys Seventh Framework Program FP7/2007-2013 grant agreement N295298. The usual
disclaimer applies.
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schools has a long history (Roth and Sotomayor, 1992) and a brief survey of the recent literature is
given in Roth (2008). In the case in which college preferences are simple2 and consist in attracting
students who are the best in each major, it boils down to what is called student placement
(Balinski and Sönmez, 1999). Such matching or allocation mechanisms are caracterized by a few
theoretical properties. First, they could be stable, or fair in the student placement literature, in
the sense that there is no pair (student, major) who would like to block the nal allocation in order
to improve their lot by matching with another partner. Second, mechanisms could be strategy
proof i.e. revealing their true preferences is a weakly dominant strategy for every student. For
instance, Gale Shapley mechanisms satisfy both properties of stability and strategy-proofness (see
for instance Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 2003). In its student optimal version, this mechanism
consists in deferring acceptance of students in each major until every student who is interested
by this major and who has been rejected by any other major (s)he would have preferred, can be
evaluated by this major in comparison with other students.
In a nutshell, the form under which the vestibular was organized at UFC in 2004 is di¢ cult
to justify. This mechanism transforms a centralized allocation of all students to all majors into a
decentralized system in which each major selects its own students from a blocked list of applica-
tions. The mechanism is thus neither stable there exist pairs of student & school which could be
made better o¤ by changing the nal allocation nor strategy-proof. Students prefer to disguise
their preferences for very demanded majors (e.g. medicine) into preferences for less demanded
ones (e.g. dentistry) in order to improve their probability of being accepted.
What we do in this paper is to contribute to the empirical literature on this subject by evaluat-
ing the e¤ects on student allocations and their welfare of adopting other more theoretically sound
mechanisms than the current vestibular. In the absence of experiments (Calsamiglia, Haeringer
and Klijn, 2010) or quasi-experiments (Pathak and Sonmez, 2013), estimating a structural model
is key for our empirical strategy. Furthermore, even if the mechanism does not induce students to
reveal true preferences, we are able to take advantage of its specic format and the data we have
to model in more detail than in the current literature, the strategies employed by students.
Our rst contribution is to build such a structural model of major choices that is derived from
the literature on school choices (Arcidiacono, 2005, Epple, Romano and Sieg, 2006 or Bourdabat
2Specically, it eliminates the need to look at preferences over groups of students (e.g. couples)
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and Montmarquette, 2007). School choices depend on (1) expected probabilities of success and
(2) preferences for colleges including future wages after college. Precise information on success
during college years and wages later on is lacking in our data and we use reduced form functions
of past educational history and ability. The advantage of our data lies in the rich information on
performance at the two-stage exams before entry (or failure). We observe grades for all students
taking the exams as well as an initial measure of ability obtained a year before the exams are taken.
Entry of students into specic majors is summarized by major-specic thresholds on grades at the
two successive exams. Students enter a major if their exam grades are above thresholds determined
in the sample.
Our second original contribution is a detailed derivation of the expected success probabilities
in entering a major given the observed distribution of grades. Students in our sample play an
imperfect information game in which a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists under general conditions
and that we show to be unique in a restricted homogenous setting. In the empirical model, we
posit the specic type of information that students have (see Manski, 1993, for a critical appraisal
of such assumptions) and we assume that expectations of success probabilities are perfect that
is, they are obtained by innitely repeating the game with the same players. We show that,
conditional on information sets, success probabilities can be obtained by resampling in our single
observed sample and by using the conditions of the Nash Bayesian equilibrium that deliver random
thresholds.
We also provide conditions for non parametric identication of the di¤erent objects of interest
appearing in grade equations, success probabilities and preferences by using either control functions
or/and exclusion restrictions. We estimate grade and preference parameters using data made
available to us by UFC that we restrict for simplicity to the choice process into two majors in
medicine, the most competitive group of majors. For simplicity also, we use a sequence of semi-
parametric regressions and a parametric discrete choice model that depends on the simulated
expectations of the success probabilities derived from the procedure summarized above.
Our nal contribution is to analyze the e¤ects on allocation and welfare of students and schools
using three di¤erent counterfactual mechanisms. Microanalysis allows us not only to study average
welfare e¤ects but also detail redistributive e¤ects between schools and between students due to
changes in the allocation mechanisms. In the rst experiment, we restrict the number of seats
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available after the rst exam to access the second stage. This tends to reduce organization costs
for schools at the risk of losing good students. We show that this risk is small. Second, the
most worthy of attention counterfactual experiment gives students more choices as in a deferred
acceptance mechanism. Students are allowed to submit a list of two choices instead of a single
choice and in consequence, the result should be stable and strategy-proof. We show that indeed,
enlarging the choice set has a positive aggregate e¤ect in terms of utilitarist social welfare but has
also distributive e¤ects. This allows us to show that strategic e¤ects in the original mechanism are
sizeable. A timing change of choices and exams is our third counterfactual experiment. We allow
students to choose their majors after passing the rst-stage exam instead of having them choose
before this exam. As expected it has strong redistributive e¤ects between schools and between
students.
A brief review of the literature The paper builds upon various strands in the literature and
in particular student placement. In a theoretical work albeit oriented towards the analysis of a
specic mechanism, Balinski and Sönmez (1999) study the optimality of the placement of students
in Turkish universities in which selection and competition among students are nationwide. Students
rst write exams in various disciplines and scores are constructed by each college. Colleges choose
the weight that they give to di¤erent elds: grades in maths can presumably be given more weight
by math colleges.
The theoretical literature on allocation mechanisms and their respective advantages under
various conditions is rapidly growing as quickly as the number of institutions which adopt such
allocation mechanisms (e.g. Pathak and Sonmez, 2013, Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda, 2012).
As for empirical papers, Abdulkadiro¼glu, Pathak, Roth and Sonmez (2006) exhibit strong empirical
evidence of the strategic moves by parents in the allocation mechanism used in Boston primary
schools. They argued that the Boston School Committee should change the Boston mechanism in
place into the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm. Their work was one of the main
deciding factors which pushed the Boston School Committee to actually change mechanisms in
July 2005. Abdulkadiro¼glu, Pathak and Roth (2009) study the mechanisms used in the New York
high school system and focus on the trade o¤ between e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness and stability
and Abdulkadiro¼glu, Agarwal and Pathak (2013) estimates demands in the newly introduced
mechanism which is a deferrence acceptance mechanism. They are able to compare this allocation
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in terms of welfare and distributive e¤ects to the previous decentralized allocation.
Demands for schools are estimated in Hastings, Kane and Staiger (2009) to study how the
enhancement of choice sets might have unintended consequences for minority students as well as
by Agarwal (2013) in which medical schools and medical residents preferences are estimated using
a double sided school choice model. There are other papers analyzing school choice such as in
Lai, Sadoulet and de Janvry (2009). Others analyze the Boston mechanism as He (2012) who
uses high school allocation data from Beijing and nds sizeable strategic moves as well. More
recent research questions the relative standing of the Gale-Shapley and the Boston mechanisms
(see Abdulkadiro¼glu, Che and Yasuda, 2012 in a school choice problem, Budish and Cantillon,
2012 in a multi-unit assignment problem).
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 describes the Vestibular system, the
modeling assumptions of the game and the conditions of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. It also
explains how expectations can be derived from this structure. Section 3 presents the econometric
model of grade equations and college choices, discusses their non parametric identication and
explains the estimation procedure. Section 4 provides a descriptive analysis of the mechanism in
place and the results of the estimation of grade and preference equations and preference shifters.
Section 5 details the results of the three counterfactual experiments. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Description of the game and modeling
We start by describing how Universidade Federal do Ceara (UFC) in Northeastern Brazil selected
students in 2004 and we formalize the timing and choices that students make. In a nutshell,
students rst choose one and only one major3 to dispute. As already mentioned, the exam consists
in two stages. The access to the second stage is conditionned by the grade obtained at the rst
stage and students are selected within the population of those who have chosen a given major.
Are accepted to the second stage all students above a rank at the rst stage exam which makes
the number of students who write the second stage exam a multiple (usually 4 sometimes 3)
of the number of nal available seats. These ranks (one for each major) denes a rst stage
grade threshold. Similarly, second stage thresholds determine who passes the exam and enters the
3We use the terms "major", "school" or "program" interchangeably.
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University. Appendix A gives further details on the mechanism and the exams.
The rst subsection denes notations, formalizes the timing of the events for the students and
the primitives of the decision problem. We consider a parsimonious theoretical set-up building up
from models of college choice. Students are supposed to be heterogenous in their performance at
the two exams and students have preferences over di¤erent majors which can be monetary or non
monetary. Monetary rewards or costs include expected earnings that a degree in a specic major
raises in the labor market.
Choices of students are the result of a game among them and the majors, and in which
information is incomplete. Agents will be assumed to be partially informed about the types of
competing students although they are sophisticated in the sense that they know a lot about fellow
students and the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in the population. The construction of
this set-up in terms of information sets and expectations is presented in the second subsection.
We then derive the conditions for existence and uniqueness of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this
game in a restricted setting.
2.1 Timing for the Decision maker
We omit the individual index for readability. A random variable, say D; describes school choice
and takes realizations, d; a specic major. For simplicity, we restrict the number of majors to two
whose names are S (later denoting the medical school of Sobral) and F (for the medical school of
Fortaleza) since we will use these two medical schools in the empirical application and since the
extension of the model to any number of majors is trivial. The outside option is denoted d = ?.
Observed student characteristics which a¤ect preferences (respectively performance or grades) are
denoted X (respectively Z). The sets of variables, X and Z; are overlapping albeit distinct so as
to enable identication (see below).
We describe the Vestibular system by a simple sequence of ve stages. At each stage, students
obtain information about grades or make decisions.
 Stage 0 Pre Vestibular exam: A standardized national exam is organized one year
before Vestibular exams begin. It is known as ENEM 4 a broad-range evaluation measures
4ENEM is a non-mandatory Brazilian national exam, which evaluates high school education in Brazil. Un-
til 2008, the exam consisted in two tests: a 63 multiple-choice test on di¤erent subjects (Portuguese, History,
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studentsability. The result of this exam is also used by the University when computing the
passing thresholds at the Vestibular exams.
 Stage 1 Choice of Major: Students apply for one major among the available options,
d 2 f?; S; Fg. The outside option d = ? implies that one renounces the opportunity to get
into the two majors under consideration and either chooses another major, another university
or any other alternative. After that stage, students are allocated to two sub-samples which
are observed in our empirical application, the rst one composed of students choosing S and
the second one of students choosing F . We do not observe those who choose the outside
option.
 Stage 1 First Exam: All students having chosen majors S or F; take the rst Vestibular
exam (identical across majors) and obtain grades. Denote the rst exam grade m1, and
write it as a function of ability and characteristics of students, Z, as:
m1 = m1(Z; u1; 1)
in which u1 are unexpected individual circumstances that a¤ect results at this exam.
After this rst exam, students are ranked according to a weighted combination of grades
ENEM and m1. Those weights are common knowledge ex-ante. The thresholds of accep-
tance to the second-stage exam are given by the rule that the number of available seats is
equal to 4 times the number of nal seats o¤ered by the major. The number of nal seats
is known before the majors are chosen. For instance, the number of nal seats in Sobral is
40 and thus the number of acceptable students after the rst exam is 160:
We write the selection rule after the rst exam as:
m1  TD=d1 (ENEM) for d 2 fS; Fg;
in which TD1 is determined by the number of candidates and positions available in the major.
This threshold depends on ENEM; in other words are individual specic, because students
are ranked according to a weighted sum of m1 and ENEM but we make this dependence
implicit in the following.
Geography, Math, Physics, Chemistry and Biology) and writing an essay.
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Students who do not pass the rst exam get their outside option D = ?, with utility,
V?, which is the best among all possible alternatives, for instance, investing another year
preparing for the next years Vestibular, nding a program outside of the Vestibular system,
studying abroad or working.
 Stage 2 Second Exam: Students who pass the rst exam take the second stage exam
(identical across majors) and get a second stage grade, denoted m2:
m2 = m2(Z; u2; 2)
where u2 is an error term whose interpretation is similar to u1 and u2 is possibly correlated
with u1. These students are ranked again according to a known weighted combination of
ENEM;m1 and m2, and students are accepted in the order of their ranks until completion
of the positions available for each major. As before, we write the selection rule as:
m2  TD=d2 (ENEM;m1) for d 2 fS; Fg
as a function of a second threshold. Again this threshold depends on previous grades since
this a grade linearly aggregatingENEM; m1 andm2 which is used to rank students. Students
who fail the second stage exam get the same outside utility as students who fail the rst
stage exam.
 College entry: Finally, students who pass the second stage exam get into the majors and
enjoy utility, say VD, which is determined by their preferences and expected earnings of this
major.
There could be additional decision nodes to take into account when preferences are evolving
over time. For instance, students could leave the game after choosing majors S or F and before
taking exams or after passing the rst exam. Passing the rst stage exam could give students a
way to signal their ability to potential employers or other universities and this would modify the
value of the outside option after the rst stage. Similar arguments could apply to the second stage
exam as well.
Nonetheless, we do not have any information on students who quit before the exams since our
sample consists only of those who take exams. As for quitting before or after the second stage,
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it seems hard to model those exits and we have abstracted from these issues by selecting medical
schools as our two majors of interest. Only 2 students out of more than 700 who pass the rst
stage exam quit between stages.
This makes the model static and the determination of choices is easy. Dene the expected
probability of success in major D as:
PD = Pr(m1(Z; u1; 1)  TD1 (ENEM);m2(Z; u2; 2)  TD2 (ENEM;m1));
in which we delay until next section the precise denition of the probability measure that we use
since this depends on the denition of information sets and expectations. The expected value of
major D is given by:
EVD = PDVD + (1  PD)V? :
We can normalize V? = 0 and therefore choices are obtained by maximizing expected utility as:
D = S if P SV S > P FV F ;
D = F if P SV S  P FV F :
(1)
We shall specify in the econometric section, preferences as functions V S(X; "; ) and V F (X; "; )
in which X are observed characteristics, " is an unobservable preference random term and  are
preference parameters. It is enough at this stage to dene choices as D(X; "; ; P S; P F ). For
simplicity, we shall assume in the following that preference shocks, " and performance shocks,
u = (u1; u2) are independent. This is a testable assumption that will be evaluated in the empirical
section.
2.2 Expectations and Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Denote  (respectively ) the collection of parameters entering grade equations (resp. preferences).
The list of those parameters will be made more precise when specifying preferences and analyzing
identication. We assume that those parameters are common knowledge among students. Denote
also T = (T S1 ; T
S
2 ; T
F
1 ; T
F
2 ) the thresholds that determine the passing of exams (stages are indexed
by 1 and 2) in each school (superscripts S and F ). These thresholds are in general random
unknowns at the initial stage since they depend on variables that are random unknowns at the
initial stage.5
5We adopt the term random unknowns to signal that the distribution function of those unknowns are common
knowledge. Measurability issues are dealt with below.
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Namely, thresholds a¤ect outcomes in two ways. First, realized thresholds, tdj ; command the
entry of students into the schools. Second and as a consequence, student expectations of their
success probabilities depend on thresholds and those a¤ect directly their school choices. We assume
that expectations of thresholds are perfect in the sense that they should match the distribution
of their realized values across any possible sampling scheme. This is this relationship that we
construct now.
2.2.1 Timing of the game and stochastic events
In those models, assumptions about expectations are key because solutions of the model depends
crucially on information sets (see Manski, 1993). The timing of information revelation in the game
is supposed to be as follows. Before majors are chosen, the number of seats in each school, nS
and nF are announced and the number of participants, say n + 1; is observed. We assume that
n + 1 >> nS + nF because the exam is highly selective. In our data, the average rate of success
is 5%. Participants are those who get a positive utility level in applying to one of the two schools
of interest.6
We distinguish one applicant, indexed by 0, from all other applicants to both schools i = 1; :; n
and we analyze her decision making. We can proceed this way because we are considering an i.i.d.
setting and the model is assumed symmetric between agents (although they di¤er ex-ante in their
observed characteristics and ex-post in their unobserved shocks).
Student 0 observes her characteristics (Z0; X0) a¤ecting grades and preferences and the random
shocks a¤ecting her preferences "0. Random shocks a¤ecting her grades, u0 = (u0;1; u0;2) at
the two-stage exam later on, remain unobserved but their distribution function, Fu0 , is common
knowledge (as well as the functional forms of grade equations). This observation scheme is also true
for characteristics of all other students, (Xi; Zi; "i; ui) i = 1; :; n. We assume that characteristics
(Xi; Zi; "i) for all i = 1; :; n are common knowledge among students as well as the distribution of
ui. The information set of student 0 at the initial stage is thus composed of W0 = (X0; Z0; "0) and
W(n) = (Xi; Zi; "i)i=1;:;n:
7
6We could also study the case in which students do not know the number of competitors when they apply. As
we have no element in the data to help us deriving a distribution for this counting variable, we prefer to leave this
point for further research.
7Those assumptions are among the strongest that we could make and assume that agents are highly sophisticated.
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After this initial stage, student 0 chooses her major (D0 2 fS; Fg) as a function of their
expectations of success P S0 and P
F
0 and other students do as well (say D(n)) according to equation
(1). Later on, the two-stage exams are taken sequentially and students are selected in or out of
each school. A realization of the thresholds as a function of observed grades is then computed.
There are two types of risks that student 0 has to face. First, the risks due to random shocks
a¤ecting other studentsgrades, second the risk induced by her own random shock a¤ecting her
grades. The former is described by the random vector U(n) whose elements are ui; i = 1; :; n, the
latter by u0. Integrating out both risks allows us to derive success probabilities and form what
will be the expectations of success of student 0.
2.2.2 Success probabilities
Denote W S(n) (respectively W
F
(n)) the characteristics of the sub-sample of students i = 1; :; n apply-
ing to Sobral (respectively Fortaleza) observed by student 0. By construction W(n) = W S(n) [W F(n)
and W S(n) \W F(n) = ?. Similarly, we denote US(n) and UF(n) the corresponding partition of U(n). We
shall see in the next subsection how sub-samples are derived from primitives.
Should Sobral, S; be chosen by student 0; her success or failure at Sobral would be determined
by the binary condition
1fm1(Z0; u0; )  T S1 (W S(n); US(n));m2(Z0; u0; )  T S2 (W S(n); US(n))g
in which T d1 (:) and T
d
2 (:) are the values of the thresholds at the two-stage exams for a school
d 2 fS; Fg when the sample of applicants to this school is described byW d(n) and the realization of
their grade shocks is equal to Ud(n). Notice that when evaluating this event, student 0 is considering
only the sample of other students than herself. Because of continuously distributed grades, we
also neglect ties.
The formal construction of these thresholds is explained below after having determined choices
but the intuition is clear for instance for the second-stage threshold. The best nS ranked students
after the nal exam are accepted by Sobral and the threshold of the nal exam is equal to the
grade obtained by the worst-ranked accepted student. Respectively, at Fortaleza the success is
We could assume that agentsinformation set of the agents is reduced to performance shifters and choices W(n) =
(Zi; Di)i=1;:n and this would not modify the estimation stage. The counterfactuals would however be more di¢ cult
to construct. We leave for further work the developments of less informative frameworks.
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determined by 1fm1(Z0; u0; )  T F1 (W F(n); UF(n));m2(Z0; u0; )  T F2 (W F(n); UF(n))g. To distinguish
those thresholds from the ones dened in the complete sample of i = 1; :; n AND i = 0 we denote
them as:
~T d1;0 = T
d
1 (W
d
(n); U
d
(n)); ~T
d
2;0 = T
d
2 (W
d
(n); U
d
(n)) for d = S; F:
These thresholds are indexed by 0 since this refers to the construction of expectations of student
0 relative to the sample of other students i = 1; :; n.
When student 0 decides upon a school to apply to, she formulates expected probabilities of
success by integrating the condition of success with respect to the aggregate source of risk described
by U(n) (remember that student 0 observes W(n) only) and with respect to the individual source
of risk, u0:8
P d0 (Z0; ) = EU(n);u0
h
1fm1(Z0; u0; )  ~T d1;0;m2(Z0; u0; )  ~T d2;0g j Z0;W(n)
i
;
= EU(n)
h
pd(Z0; ; ~T
d
1;0; ~T
d
2;0) j Z0;W(n)
i
; (2)
in which the following function concerns the individual shock u0 only:
pd(Z0; ; ~T
d
1;0;
~T d2;0) = Eu0
h
1fm1(Z0; u0; )  ~T d1;0;m2(Z0; u0; )  ~T d2;0g j Z0; ~T d1;0; ~T d2;0
i
: (3)
These are the success probabilities that can be computed from observing a single sample,Wn when
~T d1;0;
~T d2;0 d = S; F are equal to their realized values. As the only inuence of U(n) is through these
thresholds, those are su¢ cient statistics and we can rewrite the expected success probabilities as8<: P
S
0 = P
S(Z0;W(n); ) = E
h
pS(Z0; ; ~T
S
1;0;
~T S2;0) j Z0;W(n)
i
;
P F0 = P
F (Z0;W(n); ) = E
h
pF (Z0; ; ~T
F
1;0; ~T
F
2;0) j Z0;W(n)
i
:
(4)
in which risks stemming from the presence of competitors and the individual risk are integrated
out. Note that they do not depend on the determinants of the preferences of student 0; (X0; "0)
and they depend on W(n) only through ~TDj;0 that are computed below.
Denote D0(X0; "0; ; P S0 ; P
F
0 ) 2 fS; Fg the choice of applicant 0 resulting from equation (1).
Given that the sample is i.i.d and that 0 is an arbitrary representative element of the sample,
i = 1; :; n, we can by substitution construct the samples of applicants to Sobral (say) by using:
W S(n) = fi 2 f1; :; ng;Di(Xi; "i; ; P Si ; P Fi ) = Sg:
8All expectations exist since integrands are measurable and bounded.
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It is thus clear that the application mapping W(n) into W S(n) or W
F
(n) is measurable although it
remains to be shown that the application mapping W(n) into thresholds ~T0 = ( ~T S1;0; ~T
S
2;0;
~T F1;0;
~T F2;0)
is measurable. That is what we do now.
2.2.3 Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the determination of the thresholds
We can now return to the determination of the thresholds T; dened in the complete sample
i = 0; :; n and ~T0 dened in the restricted sample i = 1; :; n.
Starting with T; the equilibrium conditions yield a realization of the thresholds (td1; t
d
2)d2fS;Fg
for any realizations of (u0; u1; :; un); are fourfold:8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
nP
i=0
[1fDi(Xi; "i; ; P Si ; P Fi ) = Sg1fm1(Zi; ui; )  tS1 ] = 4nS;
nP
i=0
[1fDi(Xi; "i; ; P Si ; P Fi ) = Fg1fm1(Zi; ui; )  tF1 ] = 4nF ;
nP
i=0
[1fDi(Xi; "i; ; P Si ; P Fi ) = Sg1fm1(Zi; ui; )  tS1 ;m2(Zi; ui; )  tS2 ] = nS;
nP
i=0
[1fDi(Xi; "i; ; P Si ; P Fi ) = Fg1fm1(Zi; ui; )  tF1 ;m2(Zi; ui; )  tF2 ] = nF :
(5)
The rst equation translates that given choice S, the number of students admitted after the rst-
stage exam to the second exam is four times the number of seats available in major S. The
second equation translates the same condition for major F . The third and four equations are the
corresponding equilibrium conditions for passing the second-stage exam. For instance, the number
of students admitted in major S is equal to the number of available seats.9
As usual with dummy variable equations, this system has many solutions (tS1 ; t
F
1 ; t
S
2 ; t
F
2 ) in
an hypercube C in R4. We retain the solution corresponding to the upper north-west corner i.e.
(maxC tS1 ;maxC t
F
1 ;maxC t
S
2 ;maxC t
F
2 ) and in the absence of ties, this solution is unique. Note that
this corresponds to the computation of a nite number of empirical quantiles and in the absence
of ties, this is why it yields a unique solution which is a measurable function of Z0 and W(n).10
9There is a minor complication stemming from the fact that applicants could be in too small a number for one
of the schools. In this case the threshold is dened in a trivial way as 0. The average success probability of 5% in
our data means that the probability of this event is negligible.
10Note that this aplies to the sophisticated version W(n) = (Xi; Zi; "i) as well as the more restricted version
W(n) = (Zi; Di) since equation (5) only depend on the restricted set of variables.
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Turning to ~T0 we have by the same argument:8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
nP
i=1
[1fDi(Xi; "i; ; P Si ; P Fi ) = Sg1fm1(Zi; ui; )  ~tS1 ] = 4nS;
nP
i=1
[1fDi(Xi; "i; ; P Si ; P Fi ) = Fg1fm1(Zi; ui; )  ~tF1 ] = 4nF ;
nP
i=1
[1fDi(Xi; "i; ; P Si ; P Fi ) = Sg1fm1(Zi; ui; )  ~tS1 ;m2(Zi; ui; )  ~tS2 ] = nS;
nP
i=1
[1fDi(Xi; "i; ; P Si ; P Fi ) = Fg1fm1(Zi; ui; )  ~tF1 ;m2(Zi; ui; )  ~tF2 ] = nF :
(6)
Notice that the choices of other students 1fDi(Xi; "i; ; P Si ; P Fi ) = Sg are observed in the sample
and by student 0 since they depend on observable variables or objects that are common knowl-
edge. Therefore the distribution of ~T0 can be computed using choices and the estimation of grade
equations and equations (2) and (3) determine the expectations P F0 and P
S
0 .
2.3 Discussion of the uniqueness of equilibrium
When using the current mechanism or counterfactual experiments below, the question of the
uniqueness of the equilibrium is pending. This equilibrium is dened as a set of choice probabili-
ties and success probabilities that are mutually compatible and compatible with the equilibrium
conditions (5).
This property should be proven in each set-up and there is no general result on uniqueness
in our setting to our knowledge. It is easier to prove uniqueness in a simpler context and this is
what we do now. We assume that the scheme is the current selection scheme and that agents
preferences and performances are homogenous. In other words there are no covariates (X;Z)
and the model is symmetric between agents because grades and preferences are a¤ected by i.i.d.
shocks. We allow however for an arbitrary number of majors, KD.
We dene success probabilities, fP d1 gd=1;:;KD , at the rst stage exam and fP dgd=1;:;KD at the
second stage exam and we pile up these objects into KD dimensional vectors P1 and P: These
probabilities are common among agents. School choices, D(; "; P ); are given by the comparison
between expected value functions fP dV dgd=1;:;KD as in equation (1) in which the value function
V d describes preferences for major d. Without loss of generality, we can set V d = 0 when V d < 0
since we consider a population in which maxd=1;:;KD V
d > 0 so that Vd  0:
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The equilibrium relationships (5) under homogeneity can then be written for any major d :
nX
i=0
[1fD(; "i; P ) = dg1fm1(; ui)  td1g]  4nd;
nX
i=0
[1fD(; "i; P ) = dg1fm1(; ui)  td1;m2(; ui)  td2g]  nd:
The previous inequalities are equalities when all seats are lled. When they are not, for instance
in the second inequality, threshold td2 is set to zero (and t
1
d as well if seats after the rst stage are
not lled).
As thresholds td1 and t
d
2 solve this condition for any realization of fuigi=0;:;n we also have by
integration over u:
nX
i=0
[1fD(; "i; P ) = dgPrfm1(; ui)  td1g] =
nX
i=0
[1fD(; "i; P ) = dgP d1  4nd;
nX
i=0
[1fD(; "i; P ) = dgPrfm1(; ui)  td1;m2(; ui)  td2g] =
nX
i=0
[1fD(; "i; P ) = dgP d  nd;
or equivalently by dening d(P ) = 1
n
nP
i=0
1fD(; "i; P ) = dg
d(P )P d1 
4nd
n
 4d;
d(P )P d  nd
n
= d.
in which parameters fdgd=1;:;KD is the fraction of seats in the sample attributable to each major.
We assume that d > 0 and that
PKD
d=1 d is much lower than 1.
By construction, choice probabilities, d(P ); satisfy adding up:
8P ;
KDX
d=1
d(P ) = 1:
and for all P and ~P such that P d  ~P d for all d, we have that d(P )  d( ~P ).
For simplicity, we shall assume that preferences for all majors are su¢ ciently strong and that
the number of candidates, n; is su¢ ciently large so that inequalities are always equalities as
described by:
Lemma 1 Suppose that the sample under consideration is such that for all d; minP d(P ) > 4d.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium necessarily satises that seats at the rst and second stages for all
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majors are lled: 8<: d(P )P d1 = 4d;d(P )P d = d:
The su¤cient condition is true when assuming that there is a su¢ cient mass in the sample
having Vd > 0 and for d0 6= d, Vd0 = 0.
Let zd(P )  d(P )P d and pile up the elements zd(P ) into z(P ). The following Lemma shows
that the equilibrium is unique when success probabilities are positive:
Lemma 2 Suppose that the sample under consideration is such that for all d; minP d(P ) > 4d.
Consider any any (P; ~P ); such that for all d, P d > 0; ~P d > 0 and such that z(P ) = z( ~P ): Then
P = ~P .
Proof. The condition z(P ) = z( ~P ) means that for any d, P dd = ~P d~d. We study di¤erent cases
in which P 6= ~P and show that a contradiction arises.
Consider rst that (i) ~P d  P d for all d and the inequality is strict for at least one d: We thus
have:
P dd = ~P d~d  P d~d
and for one d at least the inequality is strict since for all d, ~d > 0. Thus as P d > 0; d  ~d and
one inequality at least is strict. It is a contradiction with
PKD
d=1 
d =
PKD
d=1 ~
d = 1. Case (ii) in
which ~P d  P d and one inequality at least is strict leads to a similar contradiction.
Therefore it is su¢ cient to consider case (iii): for all d 2 I; ~P d < P d and for all d 2 Ic; the
complement of I, ~P d  P d in which I and Ic are not empty. We have:
d 2 I; P dd = ~P d~d =) d =
~P d
P d
~d < ~d;
since P d > 0 and ~d > 0. It implies that:
X
d2I
d <
X
d2I
~d: (7)
Yet, by denition:
X
d2I
d = Pr(max
d2I
(P dV d)  max
d2Ic
(P dV d));
X
d2I
~d = Pr(max
d2I
( ~P dV d)  max
d2Ic
( ~P dV d)):
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As for all d 2 I; ~P d < P d; maxd2I( ~P dV d)  maxd2I(P dV d) since the value functions V d are
non-negative, and as for all d 2 Ic; ~P d  P d, maxd2Ic( ~P dV d)  maxd2Ic(P dV d); we have:
Pr(max
d2I
(P dV d)  max
d2Ic
(P dV d))  Pr(max
d2I
( ~P dV d)  max
d2Ic
( ~P dV d)) =)
X
d2I
d 
X
d2I
~d;
a contradiction with inequality (7).
Therefore, P = ~P .
The equilibrium is thus unique and values are obtained as a function of the thresholds:
P d = Pr(m1 > T
d
1 ;m2 > T
d
2 ): (8)
Using the fact that rst stage and second stage probabilities are xed at a certain known ratio
R = 4, we have:
Pr(m1 > T
d
1 ;m2 > T
d
2 )
Pr(m1 > T d1 )
= R
which determines T d1 as the unique solution of:
Pr(m1 > T
d
1 ) =
P d
R
:
The second threshold T d2 is then obtained by solving equation (8).
3 The Econometric Model : Two stage grades and student
preferences
We begin with specifying the two stage grade equations and with detailing su¢ cient identifying
restrictions. We explain how success probabilities in equation (3) can be derived from such speci-
cations. We then turn to the identication of random preferences and state exclusion restrictions
that allow us to recover student preferences for schools.
3.1 Grade equations
As described in the previous Section, only students who pass the rst stage exam can write the
second stage exam. Therefore in our data, the second stage grades, m2, are censored when rst
stage grades, m1, are not large enough i.e. m1 < T d1 and in the absence of any restriction, the
distribution of m2 is not identied.
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3.1.1 A control function approach
To proceed we shall write that (m1;m2) are functions of covariates
m1 = Z1 + u1; (9)
m2 = Z2 + u2; (10)
The rst stage grade equation is a standard linear model and estimation would proceed under the
restriction that E(u1jZ) = 0. This could be made as exible and non parametric as we wish. In
the second stage grade equation we use a control function approach to describe the inuence of
the unobservable factor derived from the rst grade equation. We assume that:
u2 = g(u1) + u

2
in which u2 is mean independent of u1, E(u

2 j u1; Z) = 0.
By doing this, we are now also able to control the selection bias since u2 is supposed to be
mean independent of u1 and therefore E(u2 j m1  T d1 ; Z) = 0. This would identify parameters
and the control function g(:): Nonetheless, our goal is not only to estimate these parameters but
also to estimate the joint distribution of (u1; u2). This is why in the following we assume that u1
and u2 are independent of each other and of variables Z and simply use the estimated empirical
distributions of u1 and u2 to recover success probabilities. More elaborate ways available in the
literature could be used but we stick in this paper with this simple procedure.
3.1.2 Simulated success probabilities
To predict success probabilities, two important elements are needed: the joint distribution of
random terms u1 and u2 and the admission thresholds for the rst and second stage grades. We
already stated assumptions under which we can recover the former. The latter are derived from
the denition of the nal admission in each major as described by two inequalities:
m1 + 120  ENEM=63   d1;
0:4  (m1 + 120  ENEM=63) + 0:6 m2   d2:
Thresholds ( d1; 
d
2) are derived from those linear combinations of initial grades and rst and
second stage grades xed by the University. The individual specic thresholds T d1 and T
d
2 used in
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the theoretical section above are derived from those expressions. We pospone the discussion on
how we took into account that thresholds are measured with error in the sample and argue here
conditional on values,  d1 and 
d
2.
We rst transcribe the inequalities above as functions of unobserved heterogeneity terms u1
and u2. For every student, passing the two exams means that the two random terms in the grade
equations should be large enough as described by:
u1   d1   120  ENEM=63  Z1;
u2 
 d2
0:6
  2
3
(Z1 + u1 + 120  ENEM=63)  Z2   g(u1):
Notice that the second inequality depends on rst stage grade shocks, u1; because of the correlation
between grades. Therefore the success probability in a major d as dened by equation (3) can be
expressed as:
pd(Z; ; td1; t
d
2) = Prfu1  md1   Z1; u2  md2  
2
3
Z1   Z2  
2
3
u1   g(u1)g;
=
Z 1
md1 Z1
fu1(x)(Prfu2  md2  
2
3
Z1   Z2  
2
3
u1   g(u1)g)dx;
=
Z 1
md1 Z1
fu1(x)[1  Fu2(md2  
2
3
Z1   Z2  
2
3
x  g(x))]dx; (11)
in which md1 and m
d
2 are functions of thresholds:8<: md1 =  d1   120  ENEM=63;md2 = d20:6   23(120  ENEM=63):
3.2 Identication of Preferences
3.2.1 The decision model
Students make decisions based on their evaluation of the majors and their assessment of the
admission or success probabilities. As detailed in the previous section, we assume that students
are sophisticated individuals who can form expected utility of the majors and choose whichever
gives the largest expected utility as described in equation (1). There are two issues of concern.
The rst one regards sample selection since only students interested by at least one school are
present in the sample so that we condition on the event that V S > 0 or V F > 0. The second
issue concerns individuals for whom one school only provides positive utility. This restricts their
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choice to this school only, the second school being dominated by the outside option. Figure 1
exhibits all di¤erent cases. The measure of the north-west quadrant is the probability measure
that V S > 0 and V F  0 and is denoted S = PrfV S > 0; V F  0g. In this case, school S is
necessarily chosen. Similarly, for the south east quadrant F = PrfV S  0; V F > 0g and school
F is necessarily chosen. The south west quadrant is composed by individuals who are excluded
from the sample and its probability measure is not identied.
The north east quadrant which has measure SF = PrfV S > 0; V F > 0g is the most interesting
since choices can change if success probabilities P S and P F change. In this region, we can write
the decision model by taking logarithms of the above set of equations:8<: D = S if log(P S) + log(V S)  log(P F ) + log(V F );D = F if log(P S) + log(V S) < log(P F ) + log(V F ) (12)
In this set of equations, the two variables log(P S) and log(P F ) are function of covariates and can
be estimated as seen in the previous subsection. The result that both coe¢ cients are equal to one
provides the usual scale restriction in binary models (and a testable assumption). Nonetheless,
the levels of log-utilities is not identied, only their di¤erences are so that we specify:
log(V S)  log(V F ) = X   ";
in which X contains all variables that a¤ect school utilities and " is an unobserved idiosyncratic
preference term. We assume that the distribution of " in the population dened by V S > 0; V F > 0
is a function F (: j X). We are now in a position to write the choice probability regarding the rst
school as:
Pr(D = S j P S; P F ; X) = PrfV S > 0; V F  0 j Xg+
PrfV S > 0; V F > 0 j Xg:Prflog(P S) + log(V S)  log(P F ) + log(V F )g
= S(X) + SF (X)F (log(P S)  log(P F ) +X j X):
We now study the identication of these di¤erent objects.
3.2.2 Identication analysis
As is well known in binary models since Manski (1988) and Matzkin (1993), the identication of
these di¤erent objects relies on the independent variation (due to the underlying variation in Z)
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of the covariate:
(Z)
def
= log(P S)  log(P F );
from preference shifters, X. For various reasons that will appear more clearly in the following,
 acts as a price excluded by assumption from utility. As developed in the previous section, 
is unobserved by the econometrician, yet is a function of observed covariates Z: Except in very
specic circumstances, the e¤ects of price and preference shifters cannot be identied from choice
probabilities absent an exclusion restriction of at least one Z from the Xs. This leads to adopting
the following high level assumption:
Assumption: Full Variation (FV): The support of the conditional distribution of (Z)
conditional on X is the full real line.
We can now proceed to analyze the identication issue whereby the structural objects
fS(X); SF (X); ; F (: j X)g
are deduced from the reduced form choice probabilities Pr(D = S j (Z); X) using:
Pr(D = S j (Z); X) = S(X) + SF (X)F ((Z) +X j X): (13)
We rst show how to identify functions s then turn to parameter  and the distribution
function F (: j X). Specically, those who attribute a negative value to one of the schools always
choose the other school, no matter how success probabilities change. On the other hand, those
whose utilities are both positive are sensitive to the variation in success probabilities. By making
success probabilities go to 0 or 1; we can then identify the probabilities of each of the 3 regions in
Figure 1.
Formally, this is made possible by Assumption FV. We can indeed identify S using:
S(X) = lim
(Z)! 1
Pr(D = S j (Z); X) = inf

Pr(D = S j ; X):
A similar approach can be applied to SF which is identied by,
S(X) + SF (X) = lim
(Z)!1
Pr(d = 1j(Z); X) = sup

Pr(d = 1j; X):
We can thus form the expression that:
Pr(D = S j (Z); X)  S(X)
SF (X)
= F ((Z) +X j X)
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Using standard arguments (Matzkin, 1994), this identies  and F (j X) under location restrictions
such as the following median restriction:
F (0 j X) = 1
2
: (14)
A nal remark regards weakening Assumption FV since the support of the conditional distrib-
ution of (Z) conditional on X might not be the full real line. Assume for simplicity though that
the support of  whatever X is includes the value 0. Then as developed in Manski (1988), partial
identication occurs under the median restriction (14) written above. Parameter  is identied
using the median restriction and F (j X) is identied in the restricted support in which (Z)+X
varies.
In our data, full variation is not observed and we will adopt a parametric assumption for
F (j X): What non parametric identication arguments above have proven is that this parametric
assumption is a testable assumption at least in the support in which (Z) +X varies.
3.3 Empirical strategy
We rst estimate the parameters of the grade equations and denote them ^n. This in turn allows us
to compute the expectation of the success probabilities conditional on thresholds  dj ; j = 1; 2; d =
S; F as in equation (11) using the estimated distribution functions for errors in the grade equations.
Second, in order to compute unconditional success probabilities as in equation (2), we can also
compute the distribution function of ~T0 at an arbitrary level of precision using the equilibrium
conditions (6) by simulation of U(n).11 For any simulation c = 1; :; C, let us draw in the distribution
of U (n) a size n sample Sc:We then derive realizations of ~T0, say ~tc in C samples of size n by xing
choices 1fDi(Zi; "i; ; P Si ; P Fi ) = Sg; characteristics Xi and solving the equilibrium conditions (6).
Equation (2) can then be computed by integration as:
P^ d0;C =
1
C
CX
c=1
pd(Z0; ^n; ~t
d
1;c; ~t
d
2;c): (15)
We can then estimate the preference parameters  = (; ) using a conditional maximum
11By construction, ~T0 depends on observation 0 although this dependence should matter less and less when n
is large. For simplicity, we compute those thresholds in the empirical application using equation (5) instead of
equation (6).
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likelihood approach:
^n = argmax

l(jP^ S0;C ; P^ F0;C):
This is a conditional likelihood function since P^ S0;C ; P^
F
0;C depend on the rst-step estimate, ^n:
Standard results show that when n!1 :
^n
P !
n!1
:
We used bootstrap to obtain the covariance matrix of those estimates by replicating the complete
estimation procedure as a mixture of non parametric (grade equations) and parametric bootstrap
(choice equations).
4 Empirical analysis: Grade and Choice Equations
4.1 Descriptive analysis
The complete original database comprises 41377 students who took the Vestibular exam in 2004.
There are several groups of variables in the database that are useful for this study:
 Grades at the various exams the initial national high school evaluation exam (ENEM), the
rst and second stage of the Vestibular system as well as the number of repetitions of the
entry exams.
 Basic demographic variables gender, age by discrete values (16, 17.5, 21 and 25) and the
education levels of father and mother.
 Education history public or private primary or high school as described by discrete values
indicating the fraction of time spent in private schools and undertaking of a preparatory
course
 Choices of majors
In total there are 58 majors that students may consider at Universidade Federal do Cearà.
We grouped these majors into broad groups according to the type of second-stage exams that
students take to access these majors (see Data Appendix A). Table 1 reports the number of
student applications, available positions and the rate of success at stages 1 and 2 in each of those
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major elds. These elds are quite di¤erent not only in terms of organization and in terms of
contents but also regarding the ratio of the number of applicants to the number of positions. At
one extreme lie Physics and Chemistry in which the number of applications is low and the nal pass
rates reasonably high (20%). At a lesser degree this is also true for Accountancy, Agrosciences and
Engineering. At the other extreme, lie Law, Medicine, Other humanities and Pharmacy, Dentist
and Other in which the nal pass rate is as low as 5 or 6% that is one out of 16 students passes
the exam.
Medicine is one of the most di¢ cult major to enter as can be seen in Table 2 which reports
summary statistics in each major eld and the grades obtained at the rst stage of the college
exam.12 We report statistics on the distribution of the rst stage grades in three samples:13 the
complete sample, the sample of students who passed the rst stage and the sample of students who
passed the second stage and thus are accepted in the majors. Major elds are ranked according
to the median grade among those who passed the nal exam in that major eld. These statistics
are very informative. Distributions remain similar across groups. Minima (column1) tend to be
ordered as the median of students who pass (column 6). The rst columns also reveal that some
groupings might be articial. The whole distribution is for example scattered out in mathematics
from a minimum of 70 to a maximum of 222 while in medicine the range is 189 to 224. Other
details are worth mentioning. Medicine and Law are ranked the highest and the di¤erence with
other major elds is large. The minimum grade in medicine to pass to the second stage is close
to the maximum that was obtained by a successful student in Other elds and somewhat less
than in Agrosciences. The rst stage grade among those who passed in Medicine (resp. Law)
has a median of 206 (resp. 189) while the next two are Pharmacy, Dentist and Other (175) and
Engineering (171) and the minimum is for Agrosciences at 142.
4.1.1 Sample selection
For computational simplicity, the empirical analysis uses a sub-sample of applicants to this Uni-
versity. As the allocation mechanism is decentralized, we can simply restrict the sample without
12We do not report the second stage grades as they consist in grades in specic elds that are not necessarily
comparable across majors.
13We report for the complete sample the 10th percentile instead of the minimum in order to have a less noisy
view of whom are the applicants. There are also a few zeros in the distribution of the initial grades.
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modifying the argument developed in the economic model. All other majors are summarized by
the outside option. In the rest of the analysis, we shall consider only individuals who take exams
in two majors that are part of Medicine, the most competitive major eld as shown above. There
are three majors in this group corresponding to di¤erent locations in the state of Ceará: Barbalha,
Sobral and Fortaleza. The rst two majors are small and o¤er 40 positions only while the last one
in the state capital, Fortaleza, is much larger since it o¤ers 150 seats. As shown in the empirical
analysis below, this assymmetry turns out to be key for evincing strategic e¤ects.
Table 3 repeats the analysis performed in Table 2 at the disaggregated level of those majors.
Fortaleza is the most competitive one since the median of the rst-stage grade of those who passed
is equal to 209 while it remains around 200 for the two others. Nevertheless, the pass rate as shown
in Table 3 relating the number of applicants and the number of positions is about the same in
Sobral and Fortaleza (7%) while it is slightly lower in Barbalha (5%). At the same time, Barbalha
receives applications from the weakest students as shown by the median grades in the sample of
all applicants to this major. This is why we restrict the sample further to the two medical schools
Fortaleza and Sobral.
The list of variables and descriptive statistics in the pool of applicants to these two schools
appear in Table 4. The number of applicants taking the rst exam is equal to 2867 of which 542
(resp. 2315) apply to Sobral (resp. Fortaleza). The number of seats after the rst-stage is four
times the number of nal seats and is thus respectively equal to 160 for the small major and 600 for
Fortaleza. Note also that in the pool of Fortaleza two admitted students only and none in Sobral
fail to go to the second-stage. The utility of taking the second stage exam after the revelation of
information after the second-stage is (almost always) positive whatever the probability of success
is.
4.1.2 Performance and preference shifters
Explanatory variables are those which a¤ect exam performance or school preferences. For grade
equations, all potential explanatory variables are included: a proxy for ability which is the initial
grade obtained at the national exam,14 age, gender, educational history, repetitions, parents
14When missing (in 5% of cases), we imputed for ability the predicted value of the initial grade ENEM obtained
by using all exogenous variables and we denote the result as m0 to distinguish it from ENEM which is used when
computing the passing grades. The administrative rule is to impute 0 when ENEM is missing.
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education and the undertaking of a preparatory course. Our guidance for selecting variables is
that a better t of grade equations leads to a better prediction of success probabilities in the
further steps of our empirical strategy.
Regarding the specication of preferences for the majors, we exclude from them any variable
related to past educational history. Indeed, preferences are related to the forward looking value
of the majors (e.g. wages) which, conditional on the proxy for ability, is unlikely to depend on
the precise educational history of the student (e.g. private/public sector history, undertaking
a preparatory course). This is even more likely since ability is measured after what we call
educational history. This exclusion restriction allows us to distinguish performance shifters, Z,
from preferences shifters and to identify preferences using results derived in Section 3.2.2. As
a consequence, preferences are specied as a function of ability, gender, age, education levels of
father and mother, and the number of repetitions of the entry exam. The inclusion of gender, age
and education of parents is standard in this literature. The number of repetitions reveals either
the determination of a student through her strong preference for the majors or the lack of good
outside options.
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics regarding individual characteristics and performances in
each pool of applicants to the two medical schools. Looking at the admission rates, one can see
that Sobral admitted 40=527 = 7:6% and Fortaleza 150=2340 = 6:4% and this makes Fortaleza
more competitive. Comparing the mean and median of initial and rst stage grades, Sobral has
better applications than Fortaleza. As to the second stage grades, although both schools have
the same mean, selected candidates to Sobral have slightly higher median than those applying to
Fortaleza. In conclusion, Fortaleza is more popular among students who apply to a medical school
although it is not clear whether this popularity comes from preferences or is the result of strategic
behavior of students. Our model is an attempt to disentangle those e¤ects.
Figure 2 reports the estimated density of grades distinguishing Sobral and Fortaleza applicants.
The rst stage grade density function in Sobral has a regular unimodal shape while Fortaleza has
a somewhat irregular modal shape and a fat tail on the left. The second stage grade density
functions, both in Fortaleza and Sobral, are unimodal and the Sobral density function has a fatter
tail on the left-hand side. The truncation at the rst stage plays an important role in removing
the fat tails of both densities on the left-hand side.
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There are also other interesting di¤erences among applicants to the two schools regarding
gender, age, private high school and preparatory course. There are more female applicants to
Fortaleza than to Sobral. Sobral candidates are older on average and repeat more exams than
Fortaleza candidates do and these two variables are highly correlated. The average time spent in
private high school is higher in Sobral and it is more likely for a Sobral candidate to have taken
a preparatory course.
4.2 Estimates of grade equations
4.2.1 First stage exam
We report in Table 5 the results of linear regressions of the rst grade equation using three
di¤erent specications. We pay special attention to the exibility of this equation as a function
of the ability proxy m0, which is the observed ranking of each student with respect to his or her
fellow students and the best proxy for the success probability at the exams. We use splines in
this variable although other non-parametric methods such as Robinson (1988) could be used. A
thorough specication search made us adopt a 2-term spline specication, which is reported in
the rst column of Table 5. This specication is used later to predict success probabilities in both
schools.
Estimates show that more talented students tend to have better grades in exams, since m0 has
signicant positive e¤ects on the rst stage grades although this dependence is slightly non linear
as represented in Figure 3. Among other explanatory variables, age has a signicant negative
coe¢ cient in all specications and this indicates that older students who might have taken one
gap year or more are relatively less successful in the rst stage exam. Taking a preparatory
course and repeating the entry exam have positive and signicant e¤ects on grades by presumably
increasing capacities and experience of applicants. In the second specication, we tested for the
joint exclusion of parentseducations and it is not rejected by a F-test. In the third specication,
we restrict the term in m0 to be linear. It shows that results related to other coe¢ cients are stable
and robust. The set of explanatory variables we choose yields a large R2 at around 0.72, and this
does not vary much across di¤erent specications. This promises good prediction power of the
model and makes the simulation of success probabilities more credible.
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4.2.2 Second stage exam
In the second stage grade equation, we again sought for exibility with respect to two variables
the initial stage grade m0 and the residual from the rst stage grade equation u^1 as it controls
for dependence between stages. Using both non-parametric and spline methods, we found that
a two term spline in the initial stage grade m0 and a linear term in u^1 were enough in terms
of predictive power. Results are reported in Table 6. First of all, there exists a strong positive
correlation between u1 and u2, which indicates that unobservable factors on top of the ability
proxy a¤ect both equations. All other things being equal, students are more likely to perform well
in the second exam if they perform well in the rst exam. This may due to some unobservable
e¤ort di¤erence or emotional resilience di¤erence between students. The clear signicance of the
rst stage residual signals that e¤ort for studying might have been exerted by students during the
year separating the initial stage exam revealing m0 and the proper entry exam that we analyze.
Yet, our attempts in previous work to construct a more sophisticated model including endogenous
e¤ort did not lead to the conrmation of this model and this is why we decided to use the current
simpler model. As for other demographic variables, they a¤ect similarly the second stage grade as
the rst stage grade except for gender. Results suggest that females perform signicantly better
than males in the second stage exam, while in the rst stage grade gender di¤erences are not
signicant. The second stage exam has a di¤erent format (writing essays) than the rst stage
multiple choice exam and the format could explain gender di¤erences. The lower R2 at the second
stage might also be a consequence of the exam format.
Regarding robustness checks, another concern is heteroskedasticity. We perform Breusch-
Pagan tests to see whether there is substantial heteroskedasticity in the grade equations. For the
rst grade equation, gender is negatively correlated with squared residuals although the global
F-test does not reject homoskedasticity at a 5% level (p-value of 3.4%). For the second grade
equation, the test rejects homoskedasticity at the 5% level and shows that age, private high
school and repetition are signicant in explaining squared residuals. This is consistent with the
common sense that better high school education and more experience makes your performance
steadier. However, in the rest of the paper, we adopt the homoskedasticity assumption since
heteroskedasticity remains of a limited magnitude. We checked that heteroskedasticity does not
generate large di¤erences in the prediction of success probabilities.
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4.2.3 Success probabilities
Success probabilities are simulated using the empirical distributions of u^1 and u^2 and of the
thresholds. We run nS = 2000 sets of n simulations by drawing into the estimated empirical
distribution of errors, u^1 and u^2. We then compute thresholds by solving equation (5) for each of
the previous nS set of simulators. We then replace the integration with respect to the thresholds
as in equation (15) and the integration in equation (11) by summing over the set of nS simulators.
We experimented with di¤erent numbers of simulations to make sure that simulation error is
negligible. This allows to compute simulated success probabilities for each student at both stages
of the exam and in both schools.
Table 7 reports descriptive results on these simulated probabilities. The rst stage success
probability means and medians are around 20-30% in both schools. This is close to what is
observed in the sample but not exactly identical since these probabilities are partly counterfactual.
For instance, the population of students selected in the second stage exam for Sobral school is
not the same as the population selected in the second stage exam for the Fortaleza school. The
second stage success probabilities are close to what is observed and as expected roughly 4 times
lower than the rst-stage ones since the number of students passing the rst stage is four times
the number of students nally admitted.
We also break down the simulated probability to see the di¤erence between students choosing
Fortaleza and choosing Sobral in the original data. In order to see how student choices depend
on their actual success probabilities, we compute the odds ratio of success probabilities at both
stages. We rank the population with respect to their rst stage grades and construct the grid of
odd ratios at all percentiles for both stages. The result is shown in Table 8. Some critical quantiles
at the top are provided for more detail. The two most important range of percentiles are indeed
the 70/75th and 93/95th percentiles since the admission rate at the rst exam is slightly less
than 30% and the admission rate at the second exam is around 5/7%. Odds ratios are generally
larger than 1 and odds ratios are the largest at the middle percentiles for both stages of the exam.
It suggests that students who are not at the top of the rankings are making decisions that are
a¤ected more by success probabilities than by preferences and might play more strategically. For
top students, odd ratios are closer to 1 because preferences matter more for those whose success
probabilities are large and strategic e¤ects are less important. Figure 4 shows a picture of those
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odds ratios at all percentiles.
4.3 Estimates of school preferences
We build our estimation procedure on the identication results developed in Section 3.2.2 although
we adopt two parametric assumptions. First, the distribution of random preferences is assumed
to be a normal distribution when both schools yield positive utility to students. Second, the
probabilities that only one school has positive utility are described by logistic functions which
depend on a smaller set of covariates. Following the notation of Section 3.2.2, we write the
probability measure of the regions in Figure 1, for instance the north-east quadrant (that is
V S > 0; V F > 0) as:
SF (X) =
1
1 + exp(XSF )
:
The choice probability is thus derived from equation (13):
Pr(D = S j (Z); X) = S(X) + SF (X)(log(P S)  log(P F ) +X)
in which (:) is the zero mean unit normal distribution15 and the success probabilities P d are
to be replaced by their simulated predictions using grade equations (column 1 of Table 5 and
column 2 of Table 6) as developed in the previous Section 4.2.3. In the rst part of Table 9,
we report the estimated preference coe¢ cients and in the second part we present more readable
summary statistics of the estimated probabilities of each region, SF (X). There are three di¤erent
specications included in this table. The key di¤erence is how explanatory variables enter the
specication of S and SF . We chose to use two main variables, abilitym0 and Living in Fortaleza
as the main drivers of these probabilities and the three columns of Table 9 include one or both of
these variables.
The results are very stable across specications. As far as  parameters are concerned, ability
signicantly a¤ects the probability of the region of jointly positive values, (S; F ) (and as a conse-
quence of adding up, also the preference for F alone). Living in Fortaleza decreases preferences
for Sobral alone (S) or jointly with Fortaleza (SF ). The second part of Table 9 shows that
the average probability of preferring Sobral alone (resp. Fortaleza alone) to the outside option is
15As the range of the log probability di¤erence is not the whole real line as in Section 3.2.2, the scale of the error
is not identied and its variance is thus normalized to one.
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around 0.06 (respetively 0.55). These frequencies stay almost invariant across specications. This
shows that students heavily favor Fortaleza over Sobral and this conrms that Fortaleza is the
most popular medicine school in the state of Cearà. The ratio of those probabilities is 10 which
is approximately the ratio between the populations of the two cities albeit much larger than the
ratio of nal seats in the two schools (150/40). Nonetheless, there is a substantial fraction of
students whose utilities for both schools are positive (more than 40%)
We now turn to parameters  that a¤ect preferences of students who prefer both schools to the
outside option in the north-east quadrant of Figure 1. The variables, "Living in Fortaleza", Age,
Gender (female) and ability, m0; have a negative impact on the preference for Sobral, the smaller
school. In contrast, the number of repetitions have a positive impact on choosing the medical
school in Sobral. A well educated father a¤ects positively preferences for the bigger school in
Fortaleza while mothers education does not have any signicant inuence on preferences. This is
probably because of the colinearity between parentseducations.
Finally, we tested the maintained hypothesis that performance shocks and preference shocks
are independent by introducing the residual u^1 in this preference equation. The hypothesis cannot
be rejected at the 10% level (the p-value is equal to 0.184).
5 Evaluation of the Impact of Changes of Mechanisms
We now turn to the normative implications of our results and we investigate the impact of various
changes of the existing mechanism.
The rst counterfactual experiment that we implement is to cut seats at the second-stage exam
and o¤ering twice instead of four times, the number of nal seats. The University would incur
lower costs in exchange with a possibly degraded selection if good students perform poorly at the
rst-stage exam.
Second, we experiment with enlarging the choice set of students before taking exams. They
now can list two ordered choices at most. This means that even if students fail the rst stage
qualication in one of the two schools they may still get the other major. This implies that the
average skill level of passing students increases although the di¤erence between the two majors is
attenuated.
Furthermore, there are two stages in the exam because this allows to cut costs and achieve a
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more in-depth selection at the second-stage. Another natural change to experiment is therefore
to change the timing of choice-making and allow students to choose their nal major after taking
the rst-exam and learning their grades. This would generate more opportunistic behavior.
Before entering the details of these new mechanisms, we rst analyze the identication of
utilities from estimated preferences and success probabilities that are key in these evaluations.
We show that expected utilities are underidentied and suggest how we can construct plausible
bounds for the counterfactual estimates. Second, we explain how we compute counterfactual
estimates conditional on observed choices.
5.1 Identifying Counterfactual Expected Utilities
Let the ex-post utility level be given by:
Ui = 1fV Si  0; V Fi < 0g1fSuccess in SgV Si
+ 1fV Fi  0; V Si < 0g1fSuccess in FgV Fi
+ 1fV Fi  0; V Si  0g

1fDi = Sg1fSuccess in SgV Si + 1fDi = Fg1fSuccess in FgV Fi

and thus by taking expectations with respect to grades denoting P Si ; P
F
i such expectations:
E
 
Ui j V Si ; V Fi

= 1fV Si  0; V Fi < 0gP Si V Si +1fV Fi  0; V Si < 0gP Fi V Fi
+ 1fV Fi  0; V Si  0g

1fDi = SgP Si V Si + 1fDi = FgP Fi V Fi

= P Si V
S
i
 
1fV Si  0; V Fi < 0g+ 1fV Fi  0; V Si  0g1fDi = Sg

+P Fi V
F
i
 
1fV Fi  0; V Si < 0g+ 1fV Fi  0; V Si  0g1fDi = Fg

:
As this expected utility can always be rescaled by a scale factor (the location parameter is
xed by the outside option), we will choose the absolute value
V Fi  as the scale factor to set:
V Fi = 1 if V
F
i > 0;
V Fi =  1 if V Fi < 0:
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Under this normalization:
E
 
Ui j V Si ; V Fi

= P Si

V Si 1fV Si  0; V Fi < 0g+
V Si
V Fi
V Fi 1fV Fi  0; V Si  0g1fDi = Sg

+P Fi V
F
i
 
1fV Fi  0; V Si < 0g+ 1fV Fi  0; V Si  0g1fDi = Fg

;
= P Si

V Si 1fV Si  0; V Fi < 0g+
V Si
V Fi
1fV Fi  0; V Si  0g1fDi = Sg

+P Fi
 
1fV Fi  0; V Si < 0g+ 1fV Fi  0; V Si  0g1fDi = Fg

;
the only unknown is V Si when V
S
i  0; V Fi < 0 since V
S
i
V Fi
when V Fi  0; V Si  0 is identied (see
Section 3.2.2).
Various assumptions are possible. If there is some positive correlation between V Fi and V
S
i ;
we would expect that
E
 
V Si j V Si  0; V Fi < 0

< E
 
V Si j V Si  0; V Fi  0

= E

V Si
V Fi
j V Si  0; V Fi  0

< exp(Xi)E(exp("i) j V Si  0; V Fi  0)
< exp(Xi + :5);
the last expression being obtained under the normality assumption. This is why we assume that
when V Si > 0:
log V Si =
0
2
V Fi + (log
V Si
V Fi
  0
2
)
V Fi  = 02 V Fi + (Xi + "i   02 ) V Fi 
where 0 > 0 captures the positive dependence between V
S
i and V
F
i . This is coherent with the
previous equation since : 8<: V Si = exp(Xi + "i) if V Fi = 1;V Si = exp(Xi + "i   0) if V Fi =  1:
We will thus evaluate E
 
Ui j V Si ; V Fi

using bounds on  = exp( 0) that we make vary
between 0 (the lower bound for V Si ) and 1 (the case in which V
S and V F are uncorrelated).
5.2 Computing equilibria
In every counterfactual experiment, we use the simulation procedure whereby we draw unknown
random terms conditional on observed choices. This insures that observed choices are compatible
with simulated choices in the observed data. In each simulation, let Di be the counterfactual
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choices of the students that depend on counterfactual expectations P Si and P
F
i . Denote nS and
nF the new number of seats in the cutting-seat counterfactual. In other cases nS = 4nS and
nF = 4nF as in the original system.
The rst important thing to note is that the population of reference does not change in the
counterfactual experiments. Only those whose utilities are such that V S > 0 or V F > 0 remain
in the pool of potential students and therefore we consider the same sample i = 0; :; n. In our
experiments, alternative mechanisms act only on success probabilities and not on preferences. It
assumes however that these experiments do not modify the predetermined behavior of the students
like taking a prep course or the ex-post equilibrium in college and in the labor market.
Moreover, consistency of choices and perfect expectations require that the counterfactual ran-
dom thresholds, ~T0; as dened as the solution (~tS1 ; ~t
S
2 ; ~t
F
1 ; ~t
F
1 ) to the counterfactual counterpart of
equation (6):8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
nP
i=1
[1f Di( P Si ; P Fi ) = Sg1fm1(Xi; ; ui)  ~tS1 g] = nS;
nP
i=1
[1f Di( P Si ; P Fi ) = Fg1fm1(Xi; ; ui)  ~tF1 g] = nF ;
nP
i=1
[1f Di( P Si ; P Fi ) = Sg1fm1(Xi; ; ui)  ~tS1 ;m2(Xi; ; ui)  ~tS2 g] = nS;
nP
i=1
[1f Di( P Si ; P Fi ) = Fg1fm1(Xi; ; ui)  ~tF1 ;m2(Xi; ; ui)  ~tF2 g] = nF ;
(16)
have a distribution function that leads to the counterparts of equation (15):16
P d0 = E(1fm1(X0; ; u0)  ~td1;m2(X0; ; u0)  ~td2g) (17)
We thus propose to iterate the following algorithm (we explain it for observation 0 and extend
it naturally to any index i):
1. Initialization:
 Draw C random vectors "(n);c in their distributions conditional to observed choices, Di;
(see Appendix B.1.2 for details). Fix those "(n);c for the rest of the procedure.
 Draw C random vectors U(n);c and x them for the rest of the procedure.
16Changing the timing of choices requires to acknowledge that there are no choices to make before the rst-
stage. The rst two equations in (16) do not depend on Di and PSi ; P
F
i are the conditional expectations after the
second-stage. Those adaptations do not modify the main principles.
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 Set the initial P S;00 ; P F;00 values at their simulated values P^ d0;C computed from equation
(15) replacing  by ^n and using U(n);c in the observed experiment using equation (6).
This implicitly means that choicesDi in the current mechanism are set to their observed
values.
2. At step k; denote P S;ki ; P
F;k
i the expected success probabilities
(a) Compute counterfactual choices Di(Zi; "i;c; ^n; P
S;k
i ; P
F;k
i ):
(b) Compute a sequence of ~tc for c = 1; :; C replacing  by ^n and using U(n);c and equations
(16).
(c) Derive P^ d;k+10;C from equation (17).
3. Repeat the previous step until a measure of distance d(P (k+1); P (k)) is small enough.
If this algorithm converges then this is the xed point we are looking for.
5.3 Cutting seats at the second stage exam
We start with the easiest interesting policy change that assigns a di¤erent admission rate after the
rst stage. In view of the organization cost of exams, it is tempting to reduce the admission rate
after the rst stage. As said, the existing Vestibular system usually allows the number of students
who take the second exam to be four times the number of available seats. In the experiment, the
number of nal positions is kept unchanged but half as many students are allowed to take the
second exam. In other words the admission rate after the rst stage exam is divided by a factor
of 2. We explore the possible consequences of this policy and investigate two main issues which
type of students will benet from this policy change and are schools losing good students?
Some discussion about the expected e¤ects are in order. Cutting seats in the second exam
reduces schools administrative costs although this also comes with the risk of losing talented
students. Students may not be always consistent in their exam performance and even the most
talented students may have a strong negative shock in the rst exam. Those students would be
eliminated too early without being given a second chance. Nonetheless, it could also be that
cutting seats protect the best achievers at the rst stage from competition and thus from the risk
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of losing ranks at the second stage exam. The net result is unclear theoretically and this is why
an empirical analysis is worthy of attention.
The simulation of the counterfactual follows the procedure described in Section 5.1 and we
compute expected utility as in Section 5.2.
5.3.1 Changes in thresholds
In Table 10 we present estimates of the new threshold distributions at both stage exams in the
three counterfactual experiments and in particular in the cutting seat experiment. Standard errors
are computed by using the bootstrap simulations that were generated to compute standard errors
of grade and preference parameter estimates and thus take into account parameter uncertainty. In
the cutting seat experiment, the counterfactual rst stage thresholds are much higher and this is
expected since fewer students are admitted after the rst stage exam. In contrast, the thresholds of
the second stage exam are lower than in the original system because there is now less competition
in the second stage exam when half as many students are admitted. In both rst and second stage
exams, thresholds in Sobral are more volatile than the ones in Fortaleza because Sobral is a much
smaller school.
To evaluate how this counterfactual brings benet to schools and students, we study in turn
changes in success probabilities and changes in studentsutilities.
5.3.2 Changes in success probabilities
Schools would nd that the admittance procedure has improved if abler students (in expectation)
get a higher chance of admission and the worse students have a lower chance. This is why we
evaluate changes in success probabilities in relation to an index of students abilities and we
use the expected nal grade (a combination of the initial, rst and second stage grades) as our
ability index. We also choose to concentrate on the top 50% of students because the lower 50%
of the sample have almost no chance of getting admitted whether the original or counterfactual
mechanisms are used.
We represent changes in success probabilities in Figure 5 for Sobral and Figure 6 for Fortaleza.
In those Figures three vertical lines are drawn at the median of expected nal grade and at
the quantiles associated to the rst and second-stage thresholds on average in the original system.
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Changes in probabilities are very similar in the two schools with a slightly larger success probability
improvement for Fortaleza.
The very top students who are above the second stage admission quantile, have better chances
in the counterfactual system since they now face less competition in the second stage exam. We
have seen from Table 4 that second stage grades have a much larger variance than rst-stage grades.
The chance is lower when fewer students participate in the second stage exam. For students who
are between the median and second stage admission expected nal grade, the situation is worse.
If they happen to perform well in the rst exam, they will be admitted to the second stage exam
with less competition and this entails a higher success probability. The chance that they perform
not that well in the rst exam is however much higher since fewer students are admitted and it
is this negative e¤ect that dominates overall. Finally, for students between rst stage and second
stage admission thresholds, they tend to have a higher chance of success at the rst stage and
thus benet from less competition in the second stage. It is the students who are around the rst
admission thresholds who su¤er the most simply because they are more likely to be the students
who lose the chance of participating in the second stage exam due to the system change.
5.3.3 Changes in studentsutilities and the impact on schools
Table 11 presents summaries of changes in studentsexpected utility in which students are ranked
in percentile groups according to their expected nal grade. As dened in Section 5.1, we set the
unknown weight in utilities at  = 0:8: Consistently with changes in success probabilities, only
the very top students above the 94% quantile of ability have signicant utility improvements.
Nonetheless, students above the 88% quantile also have a positive change in utility. Students
above the median tend to have lower expected utility in the counterfactual system and this is also
consistent with what we obtained for success probabilities. If we divide the sample by the original
school choice, an indication of their preference, students who chose Fortaleza tend to benet more
than the ones who opted for Sobral. Overall, these results about this counterfactual experiment
bring out no signicant total utilitarian welfare change. Yet, there are strong distributional e¤ects
and top students are better o¤ and less able students are worse o¤. We can visualize individual
changes in expected utility in Figure 7.
We also performed a robustness analysis by using di¤erent values for the weight  (see Section
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5.1). Results are shown in Table 12. When  is at the lower bound  0 utility changes are
slightly smaller. When  is at the upper bound  1  utility changes become slightly larger.
Overall, di¤erences are very limited and our previous results are quantatively robust to the value
of .
The impact of cutting seats on schools seems to be positive since the most able students now
have a higher chance of admission since they are protected from the competition of less able
students at the second stage. This benet comes in addition to cutting the costs of organizing
and correcting the second-stage exam proofs. Note that the policy in place is enacted at the
level of the University and not the medical schools under consideration and it may well be that
these conclusions are reversed when analyzing the entry into other majors. It might also be that
the schools have additional information about the correlation of second-stage exams and future
success in undergraduate studies and favor more second-stage exams that what we posit here.
5.4 Enlarging the choice set
In this experiment, students can submit an enlarged list of two majors if they wish. A choice list
contains two elements d1 and d2 in which d1 2 fS; Fg is the preferred major (since our sample of
interest comprises students who positively value at least one of the majors so that d1 6= ?) and
d2 2 f?; S; Fg. We thus still allow students to provide a single choice if d2 = ?. This mechanism
belongs in the deferred-acceptance family with the additional twist that we keep the sequence of
two exams as it is. The allocation of students after the rst exam needs however to be adapted
and this is the design that we now explain.
5.4.1 Design of the experiment
To x ideas, consider rst a student who (1) has VS > 0 and VF > 0 (2) chooses (S; F ). If after
the rst-exam, she is above the threshold for school S, her second choice does not matter. It is
only if she is NOT accepted to the second stage exam in school S that she could compete for the
second stage exam in school F . She fails when her grades are lower than both thresholds.17
Consider rst that at equilibrium tS1 > t
F
1 . After the rst stage exam, there are three possible
17There are alternative experiments that could be explored as well such as the one in which students are allocated
to majors after the second-stage exam.
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outcomes for the student:
 m1  tS1 : she takes the second exam of major S,
 m1 < tS1 and m1  tF1 : she takes the second stage exam of major F;
 m1 < tF1 : she fails and takes the outside option.
While if tS1 > t
F
1 (the probability of a tie being equal to zero),
 m1  tS1 : she takes the second exam of major S;
 m1 < tS1 : she fails and takes the outside option.
This sequence is easily adapted to students choosing the list (F; S). Moreover, for students
submitting a list (d1;?); the sequence of actions is the same as in the original mechanism. Students
are selected into the second-stage exam for school d1 if their grade is above d1 rst stage threshold.
Furthermore, given any choice among the four lists, f(S; F ); (F; S); (S;?); (F;?)g we can con-
struct counterfactual success probabilities in each major P S and P F by adapting the algorithm
we used before. For any value of success probabilities, we can then compute the optimal choice
between f(S; F ); (F; S); (S;?); (F;?)g: Details about how we get counterfactual thresholds and
choices follow the lines of what was developed in Section 5.2.
5.4.2 Changes in thresholds
Thresholds for this counterfactual experiment are also shown in Table 10. For the rst stage, the
threshold of Sobral is now larger than the original one while the threshold of Fortaleza remains
roughly unchanged. This is an indication that Sobral is admitting better students without hurting
Fortaleza. A few top students who were failing Fortaleza before can now compete for Sobral and
get admitted after the rst stage. Furthermore, some students who were choosing Fortaleza for
strategic reasons in the original mechanism can now at no risk choose Sobral rst and Fortaleza
second. Deferred acceptance mechanisms lessen strategic motives and make choices more truthful
(Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 2003). In the original system, students tended to choose Fortaleza
as a safety schooleven when they truly preferred Sobral. Giving students two choices cancels the
safety schoole¤ect. Yet, thresholds for the school in Fortaleza remains higher than for Sobral
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at both stages because it attracts more top-ability (m0) students as was shown by preference
estimates in Table 9.
Thresholds at the second stage exam are slightly less than the original ones although large
standard errors point out that those di¤erences are unlikely to be signicant (since both threshold
estimates are correlated positively). Moreover, even if this counterfactual experiment moves some
of the relatively good students after the rst stage exam from Fortaleza to Sobral, Sobral however
still attract less able students than Fortaleza in the second stage.
5.4.3 Changes in success probabilities
Figure 8 for Sobral and Figure 9 for Fortaleza report changes in success probabilities. Unlike the
previous counterfactual experiment, the changes in Sobral and Fortaleza are now quite di¤erent.
In Fortaleza, almost all students whose ability is above the rst stage admission quantile have now
higher success probabilities and the ones who benet the most are the very top students. This
might be due to the fact that Fortaleza is not any longer a safety school for some top students.
In contrast, a larger portion of students below the rst admission threshold and above median
have a lower success probability in Sobral in the counterfactual experiment. This is because good
students who fail Fortaleza switch to Sobral to compete with them and rst-stage thresholds are
now higher in Sobral and medium ranked studenst are evicted. The last point that should be
noted is that the change in success probabilities is small in this counterfactual compared with the
previous one when we cut seats.
5.4.4 Changes in expected utilities and the impact on schools
From the perspective of the students, this mechanism is also attractive since a majority of students
88% will be better o¤ as shown in Table 13. Moreover, top students benet more from the
change than less able students because they are more likely to pass to the second-stage exam even
if they happen to fail their preferred school. Students who prefer Fortaleza benet much more
than those who prefer Sobral because of the same reasons as for success probabilities. Since Sobral
has a lower threshold at the rst stage exam, students who prefer Sobral are now bearing more
competition from top evicted students from Fortaleza rankings and those who choose Sobral and
fail have no second chance. Therefore expected utility increases for those who opt for Sobral are
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purely derived from the change in the success probability and that is why less able students are hurt
in the counterfactual. However for those who prefer Fortaleza, expected utility mainly increases
because of the second chance they get to compete for Sobral when they fail Fortaleza. The e¤ect
on expected utility is thus much larger than the change in success probabilities. Expected utility
changes are graphed in Figure 10.
In summary, enlarging the choice set improves the average ability of those who pass the rst
stage exam in both schools. The majority of students are better o¤ except the medium ranked
students who prefer the smallest school. From the perspective of the schools, Sobral should be
more favourable to this mechanism since it can now attract higher ranked students. Fortalezas
thresholds remain the same although the composition of their recruitment might have changed
since it lost its safety school status. This seems however to moderately a¤ect top students.
This conrms theoretical insights that the move to a deferred acceptance mechanism is likely
to make both schools and the majority of students better o¤.
5.5 Changing the timing
In the last counterfactual experiment, we try to evaluate the impact on the allocation and expected
utility of students when they choose majors after learning their rst stage exam grade and not
any longer before. As in the original system, schools admit students to the second stage exam
according to the ranking given by a combination of ENEM and m1 and studentspreferences.
The new selection procedure proceeds as follows. Starting from the rst-ranked student at the
rst-stage exam and going down the distribution of rst stage grades in sequence, each student
chooses major S or F until the number of admitted students in one of the majors, say d, reaches
four times the number of nal seats in this major. This denes threshold td1. The sequence
continues going down grades although choice is now restricted to the other major d0 6= d until
the number of admitted students in that major reaches four times the number of nal seats. The
allocation of students to the second-stage exam is then complete. The game continues afterwards
as in the current system.
As before, utilities V S and V D remain the same while this new mechanism a¤ects the proba-
bilities of success P Sm1 = Prfm2 > tS2 jm1g and P Fm1 = Prfm2 > tF2 jm1g which are now conditional
to the rst-stage grade m1. To dene choices, suppose that tS1 > t
F
1 . A student can face three
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cases:
 m1 > tS1 : the choice set is complete and consists in fS; Fg: Majors are chosen by comparing
P Sm1V
S and P Fm1V
F (since either V S > 0 or V F > 0).
 m1 < tS1 and m1  tF1 : the choice set is restricted to F and the student either opts for the
second stage exam in F if V F > 0 or the outside option if not.
 m1 < tF1 : the only choice left is the outside option.
This algorithm is easily adapted to the case in which tS1 < t
F
1 prevails.
5.5.1 Changes in thresholds
Thresholds in this counterfactual experiment are shown in Table 10. Sobral has now much higher
thresholds at both stages thanks to her smaller size. The school in Fortaleza is overall more
popular (see Table 9) but this does not compensate the di¤erence in o¤ered seats. By making
students choose in the order of rst stage grades, positions in Sobral at the second-stage exam
are more likely to be lled earlier than Fortalezas because of the one to four ratio (160/600). For
instance, if 25% of the top 640 students prefer Sobral to Fortaleza, the 160 seats at Sobral would
be lled after those 640 students reveal their choices while Fortaleza will still have 120 seats to ll
in. Such a mechanism favours the smaller school (Sobral) relatively to revealed preferences.
5.5.2 Changes in success probabilities
Changes in success probabilities as shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12, are a straightforward
consequence of thresholds changes. In Sobral, students have lower success probabilities and the
impact is the largest for top students. In contrast, the success probability in Fortaleza becomes
larger for everyone, especially the top students who are above the nal admission thresholds. The
school of Sobral has on average better top students at the second stage exam than those in the
original system. The school in Fortaleza on average loses many elite students since it recruits at
a lower level in terms of thresholds. This seems to be the most assymmetric experiment between
the schools, Sobral gaining a lot.
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5.5.3 Changes in expected utilities and the impact on schools
As this mechanism introduces an element of exibility for the students since they can condition
their choices on their rst stage grades, their expected utility is on average larger than in the
original system. Indeed, the probability of an increase in expected utility is equal to 1. This
mechanism is mainly attractive for the top students as shown in Table 14 where students above
the 70% quantile are gaining signicantly more than students below this quantile. In a nutshell,
top students in the rst stage are better protected from the competition of lower ranked students.
There are clear di¤erences in utility changes among the top students conditional on their
preferences for the schools. On average, students who prefer Fortaleza would benet more than
those who prefer Sobral. This is then consequence of the fact that Sobral seats ll much more
quickly than Fortalezas. Given the di¤erential success probabilities across schools, Fortaleza is
now easier to get than Sobral. This is conrmed by Figure 13 in which individual utility changes
are plotted.
Overall, this counterfactual seems more friendly to top students and to the small school. Sobral
whould rather have this mechanism because it would be able to enroll much better students.
Fortaleza loses its safety schoolfeature and can no longer attract, because of strategic reasons,
those risk averse top students who prefer Sobral.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we use data from entry exams and an allocation mechanism to college majors
in medicine to provide an evaluation of the mechanism in place. We rst estimate a model of
major choices as well as performance to derive the parameters governing success probabilities and
preferences. Expectations of sophisticated students are obtained by sampling into the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium conditions. Using those estimates, we can compute in a second step the impact
of three counterfactual experiments on success probabilities and expected utility of the students.
This shows at what benets and costs the current mechanism could be changed, not only in terms
of aggregate utilitarian welfare but also in terms of potentially strong redistributive e¤ects between
schools and between students.
These cost and benet analyses show that the choice of an allocation mechanism has sizeable
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consequences for both schools and students. The mechanism in place is neither fair nor strategic
although it might be rationalized by the fact that some majors and/or groups of students would
lose if it were changed. The political economy of such a choice of an allocation mechanism remains
to be documented and analyzed and it would interesting to develop the analysis of the ex-ante
game between schools and/or students that leads to the adoption of such or such mechanism.
As a matter of fact, federal universities in Brazil have adopted since 2010, under the pressure of
the Federal government, a national allocation mechanism and some of us are in the process of
collecting data to evaluate the new system.
On the modeling side, much remains to be done. Specically, the modelling assumptions about
expectations are strong and weakening them is high on the agenda. Identication however is bound
to be weak since there is nothing in the data that might indicate whether agents are sophisticated,
well or badly informed or even naïve (Pathak and Sonmez, 2013, He, 2012). The analysis shall
thus proceed as an analysis of robustness that could lead to partial identication of the costs and
benets we have been describing above. It is also true that the question of why so many students
are taking this exam although they have no chances to succeed remains pending. They could be
overly optimistic and this relates to assumptions about expectations but they could also use the
exam as a training device for the following year or for other exams of a similar type. However,
this type of behaviour seems to be easier to accomodate in the current framework.
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A Data appendix
A.1 Description
The Vestibular, an entrance exam whereby di¤erent universities develop their own format of
testing students restricted by some federal constraints, has its roots in the creation of the rst
undergraduate course in Brazil 200 hundred years ago. Only in 1970, with the creation of the
National Commission of the Vestibular, the system started to develop a regulatory background
in order to rationalize the increasing demand for undergraduate education in the country. The
nal step that shaped the format of the Vestibular in place in 2004 was taken in 1996 with the
approval of the Law of Directives and Basis of the National Education (LDB). The LDB, among
other things, set the minimum requirements of the exam and made explicit constraints regarding
the form and content that universities must obey if they choose to select their students through
a Vestibular. Also, Olive (2002) asserts that LDB introduced a regular and systematic process of
evaluation and credentialing that initiated a new era of meritocracy in Brazilian universities. Even
though LDB reinforced regulation and as a consequence brought about many new restrictions, law
abiding universities still have in practice a lot of degrees of freedom to adapt their entrance exams
to their needs.
Roughly, the Vestibular has the following features:
1. The student chooses the undergraduate degree before the test, and compete only against
those students who made the same choice;
2. It is comprised of many sub-exams, each one evaluating knowledge in Mathematics,
Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Portuguese, History, Geography and a Foreign Language;
3. The exams are almost exclusively developed with objective (multiple choice) questions;
4. Di¤erent undergraduate courses can weight the sub-exams di¤erently in order to reect
their priorities in terms of required knowledge;
5. More than one stage is allowed during the process of testing.
6. Almost all universities developed their own exam, however its is possible to form groups
of universities to develop unied exams;
7. After the exams, students are ranked according to their grades and a pre-determined
protocol. Places are lled from top to bottom, and if there are remaining free seats, other students
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might be recalled.
8. Those who do not exercise their right of initiating the university course in the same year
they took the Vestibular cannot make it later on. However, any student can take the entrance
exam as many times as they want to.
A.2 The Vestibular at UFC
The Vestibular at UFC shares the same features described above regarding its protocol. However,
we give a rather detailed description of some of its feature in order to gain insight when developing
and estimating econometrics models. An important rst thing to know is the fact that by law all
entrance exams in public universities must be preceded by the release of a document called Edital.
An Edital is a public document that must contain the whole set of regulations regarding the
exam. It must contain, among others, a specic timeline for exams, a detailed list of syllabus for
all disciplines required in the exams, the majors o¤ered as well as the available spots in each one,
how scores are calculated, how students are ranked, forbidden actions that may cause elimination
from the exams, minimum requirements in terms of grades and so on. Accordingly to Brazilian
law the Edital is a document that possesses the status of legislation, i.e., any dispute of rights
with respect to details of the Vestibular must use the contents of the Edital as a rst guiding line
in order to settle the dispute.
The rst stage, called General Knowledge (GK), is composed of a unique 66 objective questions
(multiple choice, with ve alternatives A, B, C, D and E) exam whose content is exactly the
core high school curricula, i.e., Portuguese (Grammar and Writing), Geography, History, Biology,
Chemistry, Mathematics, Physics and Foreign Language.
Adding up all "standardized" scores gives the total standardized score XGKs . In order to pass
to the following second stage and take the so called Specic Knowledge (SK) exam, the student
must obey the following rules:
1. Get a grade in each subject appearing in the GK exam;
2. After being ranked accordingly to his/her overall standardized score XGKs , the student
must be placed in a position equal or above the threshold specic to his/her chosen major. This
threshold is calculated based on the following rule: Let N be the number of available places in
a specic major previously shown in the Edital. Let r be dened as the ratio of the number of
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students choosing the major and the number of available seats in the major. If r < 10 then the
threshold is 3N , otherwise it is 4N . Note that the threshold is not known by the candidate when
choosing majors. This information is disclosed after chosen a major.
The SK exam is comprised of two separated sub-exams (realized in two consecutive days
apart only two weeks after the release of rst stage exam results) and they are set according to
the requirements of each major. The sum of all standardized scores taken in the second stage
gives the second stage grade. The sum of all rst stage standardized scores and all second stage
standardized scores gives the nal grade. All students are ranked again and available seats are
allocated to the best ranked students.
A more specic issue with the data is that the initial stage grade, ENEM , which we would
like to treat as the proxy for ability is not observable for all individuals. An imputation method
is needed to complete the observations so that we do not lose any information due to the missing
ENEM . We regress non-missingENEM onto the basic demographic variables such as age, gender
and education history and predict values for missing data. This yields our proxy for ability, m0:
B Technical appendix
B.1 Preference model and Simulations conditional on observed choices
B.1.1 Set-up
Recall that we describe three groups of students according to their preferences: those only inter-
ested in Sobral, those only interested in Fortaleza and those interested in both. The probability
of each of these three groups are denoted as Si ; 
F
i ; 
SF
i and these probabilities are heteroge-
neous across students since they depend on Xi. Let "i = ("
(1)
i ; "
(2)
i ) be such that "
(1)
i  U [0; 1]
and "(2)i  N(0; 1). The rst random term allocates student 0 to one of the three groups i.e.
"
(1)
i  S(Xi) means that she prefers Sobral only to the outside option and "(1)i  S(Xi)+SF (Xi)
means that she prefers Fortaleza only to the outside option. If "(1)i 2 (S; S + SF ), both schools
bring positive utility to her. It is only in the latter case that expected success probabilities matter.
Let the function of Xi and the second random term:
ln(V F (Xi; "i; )=V
S(Xi; "i; )) = Xi + "
(2)
i
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be the relative utility in logarithms of Sobral and Fortaleza. Using success probabilities P Si (Zi; )
and P Fi (Zi; ), the decision is determined by:
D0(Xi; "i; ; P
S
i ; P
F
i ) = S () ln(V S(Xi; "i; )=V F (Xi; "i; )) + ln(P Si =P Fi )  0;
D0(Xi; "i; ; P
S
i ; P
F
i ) = F () ln(V S(Xi; "i; )=V F (Xi; "i; )) + ln(P Si =P Fi ) < 0:
B.1.2 Simulations of "(i) conditional on choices
We shall simulate "i;c in its distribution conditional on the observed choice Di = S (say). This
necessarily means that "(1)i  U [0; 1] conditional on "(1)i < S(Xi) + SF (Xi) so that we can write:
"
(1)
i;c = (
S(Xi) + 
SF (Xi))~"
(1)
i;c
in which ~"(1)i;c  U [0; 1]. Then, if "(1)i;c < S(Xi) the observed choice is necessarily Di = S. In the
other case, if "(1)i;c > 
S(Xi); we should condition the drawing of "
(2)
0 on the restriction that:
Xi + "
(2)
i + ln(P
S
i =P
F
i ) > 0
as derived from equation (12). This is easily done by drawing in a truncated normal distribution.
Draw ~"(2)i;c into a U [0; 1] and write:
"
(2)
i;c = 
 1((  ln(P Si =P Fi ) Xi) + (1  (  ln(P Si =P Fi ) Xi))~"(2)i;c );
or equivalently:
"
(2)
i;c =   1((ln(P Si =P Fi ) +Xi)(1  ~"(2)i;c )):
Adaptations should be made to this construction when the choice is Di = F . In this case,
"
(1)
i;c = 
S(Xi) + (1  S(Xi)~"(1)i;c ; ~"(1)i;c  U [0; 1];
"
(2)
i;c = 
 1((  ln(P Si =P Fi ) Xi)(1  ~"(2)i;c )); ~"(2)i;c  U [0; 1]:
B.2 The counterfactual experiment with lists of two choices
Here we describe how to compute the model of choice between two majors, S and F: This allows
four possible choices: (S; F ), (F; S), (S;?), (F;?) and their respective expected values: USF ,
UFS, US, UF . Those values depend on probabilities of success and on thresholds in the following
way.
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Starting with the singleton lists (d;?), we have that:
Ud = V d Prfm1 > td1;m2 > td2g
as before. For the lists (d1; d2) 2 f(S; F ); (F; S)g, we use the description of the text to state that:
Ud1d2 = V d1 Prfm1 > td11 ;m2 > td12 g+ V d2 Prfm1 2 [td11 ; td21 );m2 > td22 g
in which Prfm1 2 [td11 ; td21 ) = 0 if td21 < td11 : The choice model can now be described by four success
probabilities: 8<: P d = Prfm1 > td1;m2 > td2g; d = S; FP d1d2 = Prfm1 2 [td11 ; td21 );m2 > td22 g; (d1; d2) 2 f(S; F ); (F; S)g;
which are functions of thresholds td1; t
d
2. Those thresholds remain su¢ cient statistics in order to
derive these success probabilities.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Number of applications, number of positions and success probabilities
Groups of majors Applications % Pass 1st stage % Pass 2nd stage Positions
Accountancy 1,374 40% 13% 185
Administration 2,474 29% 8% 200
Agrosciences 2,996 41% 13% 390
Economics 1,516 37% 11% 160
Engineering 2,648 40% 14% 360
Humanities 4,897 17% 9% 430
Law 3,625 20% 5% 180
Mathematics 2,425 37% 11% 269
Medicine 4,024 23% 6% 230
Other 2,778 21% 6% 165
Pharmacy, Dentist & Other 5,312 24% 6% 320
Physics & Chemistry 1,734 58% 20% 349
Social Sciences 5,574 26% 7% 385
Source: Vestibular cross section data in 2004.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics in the two medical majors
Sobral: 40 positions
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Grade: National Exam (m0) 50.43 52.00 7.29 18.00 61.00 527
Grade: First stage 71.67 73.00 15.74 20.00 103.00 527
Grade: Second stage 240.0 246.5 33.98 94.3 296.6 160
Female 0.47 0 0.50 0 1 527
Age 19.58 21.50 2.48 16.00 25.00 527
Private High School 0.87 1 0.33 0 1 527
Repetitions 0.99 1 0.88 0 2 527
Preparatory Course 0.71 1 0.45 0 1 527
Father’s education 2.09 2 1.03 0 3 527
Mother’s education 2.21 3 0.98 0 3 527
Fortaleza: 150 positions
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Grade: National Exam (m0) 49.16 52.00 10.03 12.00 63.00 2340
Grade: First stage 70.06 72.00 20.01 20.01 110.00 2340
Grade: Second stage 240.0 245.1 34.37 48.3 311.1 600
Female 0.54 1 0.50 0 1 2340
Age 19.13 17.50 2.43 16.00 25.00 2340
Private High School 0.77 1 0.41 0 1 2340
Repetitions 0.69 1 0.83 0 2 2340
Preparatory Course 0.59 1 0.49 0 1 2340
Father’s education 2.13 2 1.00 0 3 2340
Mother’s education 2.15 2 0.98 0 3 2340
Source: Vestibular cross section data in 2004.
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Table 5: First stage exam grade equation
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
(Intercept) 27.28 26.59 78.00
(3.59)*** (3.66)*** (2.23)***
Female 0.54 0.47 0.44
(0.40) (0.40 ) ( 0.40)
Age -0.86 -0.86 -0.87
(0.11 )*** (0.11 )*** (0.11)***
Special high school -6.54 -6.46 -6.65
(1.73)*** (1.74)*** (1.75)***
Private high school 2.67 1.99 2.14
(0.56)*** (0.67)*** (0.65)***
Preparatory course 1.67 1.51 1.51
(0.48)*** (0.50)*** (0.50)***
Repetitions 2.83 2.86 2.87
(0.35)*** (0.37)*** (0.37)***
Ability(m0) 12.96
(0.65)***
Spline(1)(m0 Residual) 48.18 48.72
(4.03)*** (4.00)***
Spline(2)(m0 Residual) 89.17 89.20
(4.54)*** (4.49)***
Living in Fortaleza 3.72 3.69 3.60
(0.66)*** (0.67)*** (0.67)***
Living in Fortaleza*Ability 2.02 1.98 1.93
(0.68)*** (0.66)*** (0.66)***
Mother’s education 0.11 0.10
(0.31) (0.31)
Father’s education 0.33 0.33
(0.29) (0.29)
R2 0.7196 0.7199 0.7198
1 Living in Fortaleza is a dummy which indicates whether the student is currently living in
Fortaleza.
2 Standard errors are between brackets and * (resp. ** and ***) denotes significance at a 10
(resp 5 and 1) percent level.
3 The coefficients and their standard errors are computed by bootstrapping the procedure
499 times using the empirical distribution of residuals.
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Table 6: Second stage exam grade equation
Specification 1 Specification 2
(Intercept) 232.65 171.69
(13.72)*** (20.08)***
Female 7.36 7.16
(2.27)*** (2.28)***
Age -3.90 -3.96
(0.75)*** (0.74)***
Special high school -11.48 -12.68
(21.76) (20.25)
Private high school 8.82 9.11
(4.15)*** (4.27)***
Preparatory course 9.15 8.95
(3.38)*** (3.44)***
Repetitions 13.91 14.14
(2.21)*** (2.25)***
u1 (m1 residual) 2.51
(0.18)***
Spline(1)(m1 residual) 68.09
(28.38)***
Spline(2)(m1 residual) 153.07
(11.47)***
Ability (m0) 35.23 35.05
(3.52)*** (2.63)***
R2 0.2284 0.2286
1 Standard errors are computed by bootstrapping 499 times using
both grade equations and the empirical distributions of residuals.
2 Standard errors are between brackets and starred signs are de-
fined as in Table 5.
Table 7: Simulated success probabilities
Sobral Fortaleza
Stage 1 Final Success Stage 1 Final Success
Min. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
25% 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Median 0.088 0.011 0.012 0.004
Mean 0.314 0.076 0.203 0.062
75% 0.676 0.103 0.360 0.071
Max. 1.000 0.934 1.000 0.920
1 Success probabilities are constructed using 1000 Monte Carlo simu-
lations.
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Table 8: Odds ratio of success probabil-
ities
Percentile First stage Second stage
10 1.00 2.66
20 1.00 1.60
30 1.47 1.08
40 0.86 1.61
50 1.07 2.26
60 1.33 3.43
70 1.29 5.34
75 1.18 5.62
80 1.15 5.22
85 1.14 4.41
90 1.10 3.73
95 1.03 3.37
100 1.00 1.74
1 The first column reports the odds ra-
tio of success probabilities at the first
stage between subsamples of those who
choose Sobral and choose Fortaleza
p1sob|di=s
p1fort|di=s/
p1sob|di=f
p1fort|di=f .
2 The second column reports the odds ra-
tio of final success probability at the sec-
ond stage between subsamples of those
who choose Sobral and choose Fortaleza
psob|di=s
pfort|di=s/
psob|di=f
pfort|di=f .
3 Percentiles in rows are computed using first
stage exam grades.
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Table 9: Estimated preferences for Sobral’s medical school
Parameters
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
δS0 -2.782 -1.132 -1.167
(0.303)*** (0.309)*** (0.277)***
δSm0 0.261 0.166
(0.189)* (0.146)*
δSLivinginFortaleza -1.815 -1.586
(0.522)*** (0.283)***
δSF0 -0.453 0.521 0.484
(0.271)* (0.312)** (0.296)**
δSFm0 0.979 1.062
(0.198)*** (0.179)***
δSFLivinginFortaleza -1.314 -1.225
(0.326)*** (0.393)***
Intercept 0.075 0.334 0.0482
(0.707) (0.387) (0.393)
Ability (m0) -1.079 -0.977 -0.020
(0.261)*** (0.247)*** (0.095)
Living in Fortaleza -0.248 -0.558
(0.301). (0.314)**
Female -0.325 -0.240 -0.373
(0.139)*** (0.152)*** (0.186)***
Age -0.038 -0.045 -0.048
(0.039) (0.027)** (0.026)**
Repetitions 0.688 0.851 0.911
(0.144)*** (0.141)*** (0.210)***
Father’s education -0.278 -0.257 -0.341
(0.111)*** (0.119)*** (0.154)***
Mother’s education 0.084 0.046 0.216
(0.106) (0.114) (0.145)
Proportions
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
δS
Min 0.022 0.021 0.050
Mean 0.060 0.057 0.066
Max 0.122 0.248 0.196
δSF
Min 0.015 0.016 0.365
Mean 0.385 0.412 0.386
Max 0.816 0.852 0.559
δF
Min 0.062 0.027 0.245
Mean 0.555 0.531 0.548
Max 0.963 0.962 0.585
1 The second part of the table reports summaries of the probabilities of being in one of the
three regions of Figure 1.
2 The coefficients and their standard errors are computed by bootstrapping 499 times the
whole procedure (including grade equations).
3 Standard errors are between brackets and starred signs are defined as in Table 5.
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Table 10: Thresholds in the original and counterfactual experiments
School Sobral Fortaleza
Stage 1 Original system Mean Thresholds 183.13 190.10
Standard Errors (0.850) (0.397)
Cutting seats Mean Thresholds 196.75 200.71
Standard Errors (0.962) (0.510)
Two-Choices Mean Thresholds 187.39 190.16
Standard error (0.552) (0.434)
Timing-Change Mean Thresholds 205.59 186.89
Standard error (0.508) (0.390)
School Sobral Fortaleza
Stage 2 Original system Mean Thresholds 239.03 244.63
Standard Errors (2.907) (1.426)
Cutting seats Mean Thresholds 234.25 237.43
Standard Errors (3.124) (1.610)
Two-Choices Mean Thresholds 235.21 241.25
Standard error (2.562) (1.296)
Timing-Change Mean Thresholds 259.77 235.49
Standard error (2.315) (1.319)
1 The coefficients and their standard errors are computed by using the 499
bootstrapped estimates of preference and grade parameters and applying the
procedure in the text.
2 The cutting seats counterfactual has a few cases in which the computation de-
veloped in Section 5.2 does not converge after many repetitions, and we have
excluded those bootstrap values that do not converge after 500 iterations.
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Table 11: Cutting seats: Expected utility changes
Expected ALL D=Sobral D=Fortaleza
Final Grade mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
0% -50% -0.00033 0.00059 -0.00048 0.00083 -0.00030 0.00052
50%-60% -0.00383 0.00208 -0.00448 0.00254 -0.00360 0.00185
60%-70% -0.00751 0.00633 -0.00872 0.00617 -0.00716 0.00635
70%-80% -0.00694 0.01290 -0.01089 0.00926 -0.00623 0.01334
80%-82% -0.00851 0.01289 -0.00754 0.00575 -0.00885 0.01460
82%-84% -0.00075 0.01430 0.00073 0.00584 -0.00107 0.01558
84%-86% 0.01203 0.01002 -0.00200 0.01422 0.01433 0.00700
86%-88% 0.00229 0.01111 -0.00033 0.01141 0.00302 0.01105
88%-90% 0.01226 0.00860 0.00803 0.00319 0.01291 0.00899
90%-92% 0.01657 0.01203 0.00157 0.01103 0.01828 0.01102
92%-94% 0.01695 0.01015 0.00671 0.01245 0.01942 0.00779
94%-96% 0.02622 0.00550 0.01191 0.00157 0.02739 0.00376
96%-98% 0.03126 0.00648 0.01385 0.00293 0.03311 0.00305
98%-100% 0.02890 0.01028 0.01041 0.00230 0.03398 0.00343
E(∆Ui)
0.00080 -0.00218 0.00149
s.d.(∆Ui)
0.01107 0.00710 0.01170
Pr(∆Ui > 0)
0.3907 0.2934 0.4133
1 ALL contains all the students no matter what the original choices are.
2 D=Sobral means the sub-population of those who choose Sobral in the original system;
and D=Fortaleza means the sub-population of those who choose Fortaleza in the
original system.
3 E(∆Ui) (resp. s.d.(∆Ui)) is the sample average (resp. standard deviation) of the total
utilitarian welfare change.
3 Pr(∆Ui > 0) is the frequency of students whose expected utility changes are positive
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Table 12: Cutting seats: Robustness
Expected µ = 0.8 µ = 0 µ = 1
Final Grade mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
0% -50% -0.00033 0.00059 -0.00030 0.00054 -0.00034 0.00061
50%-60% -0.00383 0.00208 -0.00351 0.00187 -0.00391 0.00214
60%-70% -0.00751 0.00633 -0.00698 0.00584 -0.00764 0.00646
70%-80% -0.00694 0.01290 -0.00660 0.01232 -0.00702 0.01304
80%-82% -0.00851 0.01289 -0.00842 0.01266 -0.00853 0.01295
82%-84% -0.00075 0.01430 -0.00085 0.01394 -0.00072 0.01439
84%-86% 0.01203 0.01002 0.01185 0.00984 0.01208 0.01007
86%-88% 0.00229 0.01111 0.00209 0.01084 0.00234 0.01118
88%-90% 0.01226 0.00860 0.01186 0.00848 0.01236 0.00863
90%-92% 0.01657 0.01203 0.01630 0.01191 0.01664 0.01206
92%-94% 0.01695 0.01015 0.01651 0.00997 0.01706 0.01019
94%-96% 0.02622 0.00550 0.02579 0.00555 0.02633 0.00549
96%-98% 0.03126 0.00648 0.03077 0.00652 0.03138 0.00647
98%-100% 0.02890 0.01028 0.02852 0.01031 0.02900 0.01027
E(∆Ui)
0.00080 -0.00218 0.00149
s.d.(∆Ui)
0.01107 0.00710 0.01170
Pr(∆Ui > 0)
0.3907 0.2934 0.4133
1 Results as in Table 11 using different values of µ.
2 See notes of Table 11
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Table 13: Two choices: Expected utility changes
Expected ALL D=Sobral D=Fortaleza
Final Grade mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
0%-50% 0.00019 0.00041 -0.00006 0.00015 0.00025 0.00043
50%-60% 0.00177 0.00206 -0.00046 0.00041 0.00254 0.00183
60%-70% 0.00601 0.00642 -0.00040 0.00038 0.00790 0.00613
70%-80% 0.01226 0.01022 -0.00009 0.00050 0.01446 0.00953
80%-82% 0.02100 0.01562 0.00019 0.00012 0.02810 0.01123
82%-84% 0.01962 0.01363 0.00023 0.00015 0.02384 0.01120
84%-86% 0.01433 0.01039 0.00023 0.00013 0.01664 0.00934
86%-88% 0.02760 0.01886 0.00034 0.00012 0.03520 0.01363
88%-90% 0.02968 0.01713 0.00033 0.00010 0.03420 0.01355
90%-92% 0.02497 0.02098 0.00049 0.00025 0.02777 0.02034
92%-94% 0.03179 0.02228 0.00054 0.00021 0.03935 0.01790
94%-96% 0.03469 0.01907 0.00048 0.00022 0.03748 0.01699
96%-98% 0.04127 0.02469 0.00073 0.00026 0.04558 0.02186
98%-100% 0.03756 0.02944 0.00063 0.00030 0.04769 0.02496
E(∆Ui)
0.00780 - 0.00008 0.00964
s.d.(∆Ui)
0.01507 0.00039 0.01619
Pr(∆Ui > 0)
0.8814 0.3726 1
1 ALL contains all students no matter what the original choices are.
2 D=Sobral means the sub-population of those who choose Sobral in the original sys-
tem; and D=Fortaleza means the sub-population of those who choose Fortaleza in
the original system.
3 Notes: See notes of Table 11.
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Table 14: Timing change: Expected utility changes
Expected ALL D=Sobral D=Fortaleza
Final Grade mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
0%- 50% 0.00221 0.00383 0.00146 0.00223 0.00237 0.00408
50%-60% 0.01885 0.01194 0.00784 0.00807 0.02231 0.01082
60%-70% 0.04189 0.02198 0.01841 0.01606 0.04957 0.01783
70%-80% 0.09641 0.03976 0.04911 0.04427 0.10524 0.03194
80%-82% 0.13401 0.04577 0.06602 0.04275 0.15440 0.01940
82%-84% 0.14342 0.04150 0.07605 0.04903 0.15914 0.01653
84%-86% 0.17757 0.03936 0.12277 0.07257 0.18806 0.01539
86%-88% 0.19540 0.04594 0.13027 0.06396 0.21277 0.01406
88%-90% 0.22733 0.01694 0.20861 0.02565 0.22913 0.01503
90%-92% 0.27670 0.08313 0.14890 0.09739 0.30017 0.05478
92%-94% 0.28371 0.06732 0.19483 0.08725 0.30548 0.03824
94%-96% 0.34077 0.05782 0.21722 0.13380 0.35337 0.02115
96%-98% 0.42198 0.07927 0.28169 0.17460 0.43916 0.03365
98%-100% 0.54759 0.16372 0.35510 0.24210 0.59972 0.07894
E(∆Ui)
0.07259 0.03853 0.08053
s.d.(∆Ui)
0.12694 0.08966 0.13292
Pr(∆Ui > 0)
1 0.99 1
1 ALL contains all the students no matter what the original choices are.
2 D=Sobral means the sub-population of those who choose Sobral in the original
system; and D=Fortaleza means the sub-population of those who choose Fortaleza
in the original system.
3 See notes of Table 11
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Figure 1: Choice space
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Figure 2: Density plots of the grades
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Figure 3: The relation between ability and first stage grades
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[1] The round grey points are the scatter plots of first stage grade on ability (normalized Enem); [2] The curve is
the LOWESS curve of first stage grade on ability (normalized Enem).
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Figure 4: The Odds ratio plot of simulated success probabilities
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[1] The star points are odds ratio at the first stage ; [2] the triangular points are the odds ratio at the second stage;
[3] percentiles are computed using first stage grades.
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Figure 5: Cutting seats: Changes of success probabilities in Sobral
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[1] The circles are individual success probability changes vs expected final grades; [2] From left to right, 1) the first
vertical line is the median, 2) the second line is the quantile of 1st stage admission – (1− 4(nos+nof)nobs )× 100%, and
3) the third line is the quantile of 2nd stage admission – (1 − (nos+nof)nobs ) × 100%. [3] nos is the number of final
seats in Sobral, nof is the number of final seats in Fortaleza and nobs is the number of total applicants.
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Figure 6: Cutting seats: Changes of success probabilities in Fortaleza
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See notes of Figure 5
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Figure 7: Cutting seats: Expected utility changes
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[1] the grey squares (resp. blue triangles) report changes in expected utilities and expected final grades for those
who choose Sobral (resp. Fortaleza) in the original system. [2] the red line is the 0 level; [3] the vertical lines are
as in Figure 6.
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Figure 8: Two choices: Success probability change in Sobral
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Notes: See notes of Figure 5
73
Figure 9: Two choices: Success probability change in Fortaleza
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l l
lll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l ll l ll ll l
l
l l llll l lll ll
l
l l
l
l l
l
l ll
l
l ll lll ll lll ll lll l l lll lll l lll lll ll ll lll llll ll ll ll l l l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
lll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
ll lll l lll ll ll ll ll ll ll lll llll l lll l lll llll ll l ll lll lll l l lll lll ll lll lll l lll l llll lll
50 100 150 200 250
−
0.
01
0
−
0.
00
5
0.
00
0
0.
00
5
0.
01
0
0.
01
5
0.
02
0
Su
cc
es
s 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
ch
an
ge
Expected final grade
Notes: See notes of Figure 5
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Figure 10: Two choices: Expected utility changes
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Figure 11: Timing change: Success probability changes in Sobral
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Notes: See notes of Figure 5
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Figure 12: Timing change: Success probability changes in Fortaleza
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Figure 13: Timing change: Expected utility changes
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